Secrecy Constrained Distributed Inference in Wireless Sensor Networks by Guo, Jun

c© 2017
Jun Guo
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE COLLEGE
DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND FINAL READING APPROVALS
of the dissertation submitted by
Jun Guo
Dissertation Title: Secrecy Constrained Distributed Inference In Wireless Sensor Net-
works
Date of Final Oral Examination: 7th April 2017
The following individuals read and discussed the dissertation submitted by student
Jun Guo, and they evaluated his presentation and response to questions during the
final oral examination. They found that the student passed the final oral examination.
Hao Chen, Ph.D. Chair of the Supervisory Committee
John Chiasson, Ph.D. Member, Supervisory Committee
Leming Qu, Ph.D. Member, Supervisory Committee
Qi Cheng, Ph.D. External Examiner
The final reading approval of the dissertation was granted by Hao Chen, Ph.D.,
Chair of the Supervisory Committee. The dissertation was approved by the Graduate
College.
dedicated to my family
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In his book, The Ph.D. Grind, Philip Guo wrote, “there would be no Ph.D.
without ten thousand hours of unglamorous, hard-nosed grinding”. I have the same
feeling about my pursuit of Ph.D., which is closing to an end. However, I do not think
hard work alone is enough for me to come so far without the guidance, encouragement
and support from my advisor, professors, family and friends. So, I would like to
express my gratitude to all of them on this page.
I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Dr. Hao Chen, for his belief in me from the
very beginning and patient guidance on my research during the course of my Ph.D.
study. I have learned a great deal on statistical inference from Dr. Chen, but one
thing I am most impressed is his mathematical intuition. “Our intuition is based
on accumulated and compiled experiences, not on magic”, mentioned in the book,
The power of intuition, which means it is not something that one can pick up in a
short amount of time; however it motivates me to keep accumulating, learning and
thinking for the rest of my life. Besides, his sharpness and humor make me feel that
he is more like a mentor and a caring friend, who also gave me freedom and support
to collaborate with other professors and researchers on signal processing and machine
learning projects.
I am grateful to Dr. John Chiasson, Dr. Leming Qu, and Dr. Qi Cheng for
serving in my committee. Dr. Chiasson’s machine learning course motivated me to
dive into the field of deep learning. We often discuss things beyond engineering topics
and his humor definitely made my Ph.D. life more pleasant.
v
I would like to thank my close collaborator, Uri Rogers. I had the distinct pleasure
of working with and learning from Uri on statistical inference and his way of writing.
I am really fortunate to have friends, Kehan Zhu and Mucun Tian during the
course of my doctoral study. Throughout these years, we encourage and help out
each other on research and daily lives.
This thesis is dedicated to my mother for the unconditional love, support and
belief in me. To my sister, Jin, who always cares me deeply in her heart and taught
me to be a resilient person. To my wife, Yuwen, who helps me find my inner peace
and gives strength to keep exploring the road less traveled. To my child, who always
reminds me to have a beginner’s mind.
Last but not the least, the writing of this thesis heavily relies on open-source
operating system and tools including GNU/Linux, LATEX, LaTeX draw, Vim, Emacs,
Python, git, Gummi and so on. I revere the visionary leaders in free software
revolution, Richard Stallman and Linus Torvalds who made free software possible
at the very beginning. I am also thankful for all the programmers and donors who
contribute to open-source software. Your great work indeed makes the world a better
place.
vi
ABSTRACT
Comprised of a large number of low-cost, low-power, mobile and miniature sensors,
wireless sensor networks are widely employed in many applications, such as envi-
ronmental monitoring, health-care, and diagnostics of complex systems. In wireless
sensor networks, the sensor outputs are transmitted across a wireless communication
network to legitimate users such as fusion centers for final decision-making.
Because of the wireless links across the network, the data are vulnerable to security
breaches. For many applications, the data collected by local sensors are extremely
sensitive, and care must be taken to prevent that information from being leaked to
any malicious third parties, e.g., eavesdroppers. Eavesdropping is one of the most
significant threats to wireless sensor networks, where local sensors are tapped by an
eavesdropper in order to intercept information.
I considered distributed inference in the presence of a global, greedy and informed
eavesdropper who has access to all local node outputs rather than access. My
goal is to develop secured distributed systems against eavesdropping attacks using
a physical-layer security approach instead of cryptography techniques because of
the stringent constraints on sensor networks energy and computational capability.
The physical-layer security approach utilizes the characteristics of the physical layer,
including transmission channels noises, and the information of the source. Addi-
tionally, physical-layer security for distributed inference is scalable due to the low
computational complexity.
I first investigate secrecy constrained distributed detection under both Neyman-
vii
Pearson and Bayesian frameworks. I analyze the asymptotic detection performance
and proposed a novel way of analyzing the maximum performance trade-off us-
ing Kullback-Leibler divergence ratio between the fusion center and eavesdropper.
Under the Neyman-Pearson framework, I show that the eavesdropper’s detection
performance can be limited such that her decision-making is no better than random
guessing; meanwhile, the detection performance at the fusion center is guaranteed at
the prespecified level. Similar analyses and proofs are provided under the Bayesian
framework, where it was shown that an eavesdropper can be constrained to an error
probability level equal to her prior information. Additionally, I derive the asymptotic
error exponent and show that asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect
detection are possible by increasing the number of sensors under both frameworks if
the fusion center has noiseless channels to the sensors.
For secrecy constrained distributed estimation, I conducted similar analysis under
both a classical setting and Bayesian setting. I derived the maximum achievable
secrecy performance and show that under the condition that the eavesdropper has
noisy channels and the fusion center has noiseless channels, both asymptotic perfect
secrecy and asymptotic perfect estimation can be achieved under a classical setting.
Similarly, under a Bayesian setting, I derived the performance trade-off using Fisher
information ratio and show that the fusion center outperforms the eavesdropper
significantly in the simulation section.
Secrecy constrained in distributed inference with Rayleigh fading binary symmet-
ric channel is considered as well. Similarly, I derive the maximum achievable secrecy
performance ratio for both detection and estimation.
The maximum achievable trade-off turns out to be almost the same in distributed
estimation as in distributed detection. This suggests that a universal framework for
viii
generally structured inference problems are feasible. Further investigations are needed
to justify this conjecture for more general applications.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Comprised of a large number of low-cost, low-power, mobile and miniature sensors,
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are systems of detecting phenomena, estimating
parameters or measuring some physical properties of the environment, where sensors
are densely deployed to the region of interest [1, 5, 83, 88]. Many WSNs have a
dedicated node called sink node or fusion center (FC), of which the computational
capability is more powerful than other sensing nodes because of data fusion require-
ments. Due to energy constraints, time-delay, bandwidth and memory limitations,
the local nodes cannot send all the observed information directly to the FC where
the final decision is made. The data observed by local sensors must be quantized or
compressed before transmission over wireless channels to the FC. Therefore, one of
the essential problems in WSNs is to design and optimize the local quantization rule
for local nodes and fusion rule at the decision center in order to make the optimal
inference at the FC based on the transmitted data from senors [5, 83, 88, 100].
1.1.1 Topologies in WSNs
Different WSNs have different network topologies, which determines different ways of
communications within sensors and how the sensors send their data to the FC. The
2common topologies in WSNs include peer to peer networks, parallel (star) networks,
tree networks, and mesh networks [72].
Physical Property
Sensor 1 Sensor 3
X1 X3
Sensor 2
X2
Channel Channel
Channel
Figure 1.1: Peer-to-Peer Topology
In peer-to-peer network for three sensors shown in Figure 1.1, local sensors observe
the physical property and they are able to send the outputs to each other across their
respective channels. In this way, each sensor can be considered as the FC. Therefore,
this network topology is flexible in a sense that when one sensor fails, another sensor
could take over the job for decision making.
In Figure 1.2, we show the parallel (star) structure, where sensors observe phenom-
ena in parallel and send their outputs to a FC through parallel channels. Unlike the
peer-to-peer topology, each node cannot directly communicate with one another, and
the FC is a fixed receiver. Parallel network is one of the most widely used structure in
3Physical Properties
Sensor 1 Sensor 2
...
Sensor N
X1 X2 Xi
XN
Channel
Fusion Center
...
γ1 γ2 γi γN
Sensor i
...
Decision
...
Figure 1.2: Parallel Topology
WSNs due to its simplicity and robustness. Under such a setting, the failure of a small
portion of sensors will not deteriorate the performance of the network significantly.
Tree network, shown in Figure 1.3, however, is a hierarchical structure, where low
4Physical Properties
...
High level
Fusion Center
...
Decision
Mid level
Low level
... ...
Figure 1.3: Tree Topology
level sensors observe the physical properties and then send their outputs to the next
level and they keep doing so until the FC receives the output from high level nodes.
This multi-hop communication is expected to consume less power than the single hop
communication. Furthermore, the transmission power is low [97].
Mesh structured network with four sensors is shown in Figure 1.4. This setup
allows data to hop from sensor to sensor. Similar to peer-to-peer topology, mesh
network allows sensors to directly transmit the data to another sensor and the FC
does not need to be fixed. Another advantage of this structure is that data can be
transmitted from different routes to the desired location. The mesh network is the
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most complicated structure.
To sum up, the characteristics of common topologies for WSNs are summarized in
Table 1.1. The topology of a WSN does not necessarily remain the same because the
sensors could be mobile and their locations may change from one place to another.
1.1.2 Sensors Communication Protocol
With the topologies of WSNs defined, we know the structure of communications
in WSNs. However, without the definition of communication protocol, sensors still
could not communicate with each other. Such communication protocols are used
6Table 1.1: Characteristics of Common Topologies for WSNs
Topology Name Advantages Disadvantages
Peer-to-Peer flexible not robust to sensor failures
Parallel
simple; robust in terms of sensor not flexible
failures and network performance
Tree
flexible; energy-efficient not robust to backbone
sensor failures
Mesh flexible; robust complicated
by sensor-to-sensor and sensor-to-FC. A protocol diagram is illustrated in Figure
1.5, which consists of the application layer, transport layer, network layer, data link
layer, physical layer, power management plane, mobility management plane, and task
management plane [1].
Each layer has their own functionalities and knows how to respond to the requests
from the layer below or above. The main functions are summarized as follows:
• The application layer interacts with the end users and specifies how the data
are requested.
• The transport layer sends and receives data upon request from the application
layer. It is especially needed when the system needs to access through external
networks.
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Figure 1.5: Wireless sensor network protocol stack. [1]
• The network layer routes the incoming data to the desired locations.
• The data link layer is responsible for the multiplexing of data streams, data
frame detection, medium access and error control.
• The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency gen-
eration, signal detection, modulation, and data encryption.
Meanwhile, the power, mobility and task management planes in Figure 1.5 monitor
the power, movement and task among the nodes. The planes reduce the overall energy
8consumption and coordinate different tasks.
1.1.3 WSNs Applications
With topology and communication protocols in mind, the natural question is what
kind of applications we can apply with WSNs. In fact, WSNs are widely employed in
many applications such as environmental monitoring, cyber-physical systems, health-
care, diagnostics of complex systems and military applications and so on. We sum-
marize the main applications as the following categories.
• Environmental monitoring includes temperature monitoring (forest fire detec-
tion), flood detection, geophysical research and so on [69, 76, 91]. Take forest
fire detection as an example, where a large number of sensors are randomly
and densely deployed to a forest in order to collect data on weather conditions
including temperature, wind speed, rain and relative humidity. These sensors
need to be durable in that they are often exposed to harsh environments. They
send the compressed outputs to the FC through the wireless communication
module, then the FC combines the information collected by local nodes and
makes the final decision whether there is a fire or not in that forest [7].
• A cyber-phyiscal system is defined as the system where physical and software
components are deeply intertwined, each operating on different spatial and
temporal scales, exhibiting multiple and distinct behavioral modalities, and
interacting with each other in a myriad of ways that change with context
[40, 61]. WSNs play an important role in sensing and providing information
for such systems including smart grids and nuclear power plants [54, 95]. For
smart grids, a large number of sensors are distributed for monitoring long range
9power transmission lines in order to improve transmission efficiency, reliability
and sustainability [26, 29].
• Health related applications include tracking patients’ physiological conditions,
movements and behaviors. For this purpose, patients usually wear different
types of wireless sensors to collect data on body conditions [31, 102]. For real-
time applications such as telemonitoring of patients, sensors transmit to the
FC securely in real-time. For offline decision-making, such as future medical
diagnostics, drug administration in hospitals and so on, sensors collect data for
a long time and then securely transmit the data to the FC.
• For complex systems like vehicles, airplanes or nuclear plants, WSNs keep
monitoring the conditions of the parts, the environment or the function units,
once the fault or anomaly occurs, the sensors would report to the FC [46, 50, 64].
One example for this application is a WSN deployed in an airplane cabin to
monitor particulate matter, carbon dioxide, pressure and humidity to make
sure the environment is suitable for passengers [35].
• Military applications include battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance of op-
posing forces. WSNs can be deployed to detect, localize and track targets,
moreover, they can be used to assess damage conditions, monitoring equipment
and ammunition [62, 80].
From the above categories, we can see that WSNs have already changed our
lives in many aspects, more importantly, WSNs also have the potential for many
future applications, one of which is intelligent transportation systems, where sensors
mounted on vehicles wirelessly communicate with other vehicles or infrastructure
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sensor nodes in order to improve the overall quality of road transportations including
safety, congestion, emissions, and traffic waiting time [23, 42, 51]. The Internet of
things is another application of WSNs which aims at connecting home appliances,
smart phones and other Internet connected devices [4] in order to improve energy-
efficiency, convenience, safety and so on.
1.2 Cyber Attacks in WSNs
Wireless communication makes the aforementioned applications possible, on the other
hand, wireless communication allows local nodes to broadcast and all of their wireless
packets are potentially available to any other listeners. It also means WSNs are
vulnerable to all kinds of attacks. As the data collected by the aforementioned
applications could be extremely sensitive, care must be taken to prevent the collected
information from being leaked to any malicious third parties. Thus, we need to
understand the potential strategies of attackers against WSNs in order to defend
them effectively.
In [92], Wang et al. surveyed cyber threats in sensor networks, which is summa-
rized in Table 1.2. According to the security requirements in WSNs, these attacks
can categorized as [73]:
• Secrecy and authentication attacks where eavesdroppers either passively listen
to packets or modify packets in order to gain certain advantages.
• Network availability attacks where attackers keep communication channels busy
so that transmitters won’t be able to send anything through the channel to
receivers, e.g., jamming attackers, denial-of-service attackers (Table 1.2).
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• Stealthy attacks against service integrity where attackers falsify the data and
make the network accept it so that the decision center is confused, e.g., Byzan-
tine attackers.
Among all of these attacks, this dissertation concentrates on eavesdropping at-
tacks in that it forms the basis or starting point for a large number of different,
more malicious attack strategies. For example, if Byzantine attackers, jammers or
intruders have reliable information provided by the eavesdropper, their subsequent
attacks could be more efficient [65]. There are two types of eavesdropping attacks,
passive and active. Passive eavesdroppers detect the information by tapping the data
transmissions between the local sensors and the legitimate user; active eavesdroppers,
however, send queries to some local sensors by disguising themselves as friendly nodes
[20]. In this dissertation, we consider the general problem of passive eavesdropping
because it is the foundation of active eavesdropping and it is difficult to detect and
defend.
1.3 Cyber Defense Mechanisms
Since this dissertation focuses on eavesdropping attacks against WSNs, we need to
survey the available defending mechanisms against eavesdroppers and evaluate the
feasibility of applying the algorithms to WSNs. In [92], authors mentioned that
the standard cryptography algorithms may prevent eavesdroppers and protect the
secrecy of the system. To further investigate this issue, we discuss whether the current
research on cryptography for WSNs is fully practical due to the constraints on WSNs.
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Table 1.2: Denial-of-service Attacks in WSNs [92]
Layer Attacks Defense
Physical
Jamming Spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower
duty cycle, region mapping, mode change
Tampering Tampering-proofing, hiding
Link
Collision Error-correcting code
Exhaustion Rate limitation
Unfairness Small frames
Network
Spoofed, altered Egress filtering, authentication, monitoring
Selective forward-
ing
Redundancy, probing
Sinkhole Authentication, monitoring, redundancy
Sybil Authentication, probing
Wormholes Authentication, packet leashes by using geo-
graphic and temporal information
Hello food attacks Authentication, verify the bidirectional link
Acknowledgement
spoofing
Authentication
Transport
Flooding Client puzzles
Desynchronization Authentication
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1.3.1 Cryptography in WSNs
Cryptographic algorithms, which includes public key and symmetric key [37], have
been widely used for computer networks where the nodes (computers) are powerful
enough to implement the algorithms. However, due to the constraints in WSNs, where
sensors are often operated on a limited battery power and limited computational
power, many existing algorithms are not practical for use. Next, we discuss the
feasibility of implementing the recent research on public key and symmetric key in
WSNs.
Public Key Cryptography in WSNs
This asymmetric cryptography scheme uses pairs of keys: public keys which can be
distributed widely, and private keys which are known only to the owner. Anyone can
encrypt messages using the public key, however, only the owner of that paired private
key can decrypt the message.
There are several popular public key algorithms such as the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol [21] or RSA signatures [67], however they are undesirable for
WSNs due to the computational intensity and power consumption. One possible
solution is elliptic curve cryptography algorithm [43, 57], which appears to offer equal
security for a far smaller key size, thereby reducing processing and communication
overhead. Some of the researchers implemented different ECC cryptography algo-
rithms on microprocessors such as Atmel ATmega128 [30, 49, 90], however, the public
key operations are still expensive for these processors, not to mention less powerful
devices as the nodes of WSNs.
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Symmetric Key Cryptography in WSNs
Unlike public key cryptography, symmetric key scheme uses the same cryptography
keys for both encryption and decryption. The keys can be identical or a simple
transformation applied between the two keys. This scheme consumes much less com-
putational energy. In order to investigate the feasibility of symmetric key for WSNs,
several popular algorithms including RC4 [56], RC5 [68], IDEA [56], SHA-1 [25] and
MD5 [56, 66] were implemented on different microprocessors ranging in word size
from 8-bit to 16-bit. The researchers compared the operation time and energy with
these algorithms and they concluded that symmetric key cryptography is preferred in
a WSN. The measurements on average execution time and energy consumption with
different algorithms on Atmel ATmega128 processor are summarized in Table 1.3 and
Table 1.4, respectively.
Table 1.3: Symmetric Key Cryptography: Average Execution Times on
Atmel ATmega128 [38]
Algorithm Operation Time (ms)
RC5 [68] 0.26ms
Skipjack [59] 0.38ms
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Table 1.4: Symmetric Key Cryptography: Average Energy Consumption
on Atmel ATmega128 [90]
Algorithm Energy
SHA-1 [25] 5.9 mJ/byte
AES-128 Enc/Dec [19] 1.62/2.49 mJ/byte
1.3.2 Physical-Layer Security Approach
Even though the symmetric key cryptography algorithms presented in section 1.3.1
consume low-power, they may not be low enough for long term WSNs operations,
furthermore, they do require the devices to have the computational capability to per-
form the required tasks which may not be true for some of the nodes [98]. Therefore,
it is not always possible to completely rely on cryptographic techniques. Besides, key
distribution brings another problem to WSNs, especially for dense WSNs. To address
these issues, information-theoretic (physical-layer) security approaches, utilizing the
characteristics of the physical layer, including transmission channels noises, and the
information of the source, have gained considerable attention on this method to
enhance the security, secrecy and privacy of WSNs [3, 55, 78, 103]. Additionally,
physical-layer security for distributed detection is scalable due to the low computa-
tional complexity [74]. Physical-layer security approaches can be used along with
cryptosystems to further enhance WSNs and make the systems even more secure.
Based on a physical-layer security approach, several attempts were made to com-
bat eavesdropping attacks for WSNs under the assumption that an attacker has partial
or full access to sensor outputs [36]. Nadenla et al. considered the secrecy problem in
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distributed detection against eavesdropping attacks for WSNs in parallel networks,
where the goal was to maximize Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) at the FC for one
sensor, DF , under the constraint that KLD at an eavesdropper for one sensor, DE,
is no more than a pre-specified threshold TE [58]. For a two-sensor network, where
the attacker has the access to one of the sensors output, Li et al. jointly designed
sensor decision rules and fusion rules to maximize the FC detection probability by
constraining both the FC’s probability of false alarm and eavesdropper’s detection
probability [48]. For privacy issues, Li and Oechtering formulated privacy-constrained
and privacy-concerned optimization problems under Bayesian framework and derived
the optimal privacy detection rule under a privacy guarantee constraint [47].
As for the secrecy constrained distributed estimation in WSNs, Aysal et al. pro-
posed to solve the problem by adding a stochastic cipher as a security module, to
randomly change the sensor outputs and disguise them from the eavesdropper [2].
Guo et al. considered using multiple-input multiple-output beamforming strategies
to combat eavesdroppers, where local sensors use the analog amplify and forward
scheme to communicate with the FC over a slow-fading orthogonal multiple access
channel [28]. In [41], Khan and Stankovic´ proposed to securely estimate distributed
data in cyber-physical systems by verifying statistical consistency on the nodal, local
information and physical layer feedback.
Notice that the aforementioned efforts did not focus on the maximum achievable
inference performance trade-off, nor did they explore the possibility of asymptotic
perfect secrecy. For a specific channel model, Marano et al. designed sensor rules for
WSNs under the perfect secrecy constraint such that the eavesdropper gains no infor-
mation from the observations on the channel activities without direct access to sensors
outputs [53]. However, the channel model considered in that paper is constrained and
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cannot be directly employed under more general noisy channel models.
1.4 Contributions and Overview of the Thesis
This dissertation focuses on using a physical-layer security approach to address the
distributed inference problems with secrecy constraints in a sense that a WSN with
parallel topology is eavesdropped by a global, greedy and informed eavesdropper,
which has access to all the sensors outputs. The reason we consider parallel structure
for WSNs lies in that it is simple and robust to sensor failures, when a small portion
of sensor dies, the performance of the network would not be deteriorated. As a
malicious user, this eavesdropper passively listens to the sensor outputs and aims at
making informative decisions. However, the data collected by sensors are extremely
sensitive, our goal is to prevent a malicious third party (eavesdropper) from stealing
information from local nodes. Therefore, the ideal design for a sensor network is
perfect secrecy where an eavesdropper does not obtain any useful information. We
will discuss the possibility of (asymptotic) perfect secrecy. Moreover, we investigate
performance trade-offs between the FC and eavesdropper, where the performance of
the attacker is constrained to a level such that she could not make an informative
inference; meanwhile, the performance of the legitimate user (FC) is guaranteed to
perform well at the desired level. Utilizing the metrics of measuring secrecy in both
detection and estimation problems, we provide results on the maximum achievable
inference performance trade-off between the FC and eavesdropper.
This dissertation is organized as follows,
Chapter 2: Background and Fundamental Concepts
In this chapter, we introduce the key concepts in understanding the materials
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in the following chapters. The fundamental concepts include distributed detection,
distributed estimation and secrecy metrics under different frameworks.
Chapter 3: Secrecy Constrained Distributed Detection in WSNs
We first investigate detection problems under secrecy constraints. The main
contributions of secrecy constrained distributed detection in WSNs are summarized
as follows:
1. Analyze the detection performance at the FC and eavesdropper, respectively.
For the case where the sensor outputs are binary, we evaluate the quality of
the received sensor decisions when the sensors employ likelihood ratio quantizer
(LRQ) close to the extreme points on receiver operating characteristics (ROC)
curve.
2. Utilizing performance analysis, we propose a novel approach of analyzing the
performance trade-off between the FC and eavesdropper using the maximum
achievable detection performance ratio between the FC and eavesdropper, given
both a noise free and noisy FC channel. Additionally, we show that both
asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect detection are possible by
increasing the number of sensors when the FC has noiseless channels under the
Neyman-Pearson framework.
3. Under the Bayesian framework, we analyze the performance in terms of prob-
ability of error, where the detectability of an eavesdropper can be limited to a
level where she can only rely on her prior information. The limit of optimal FC
detection performance is derived for the performance trade-off analysis. Using
the approximated asymptotic error exponent we obtained for both the FC and
eavesdropper, we show that both asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic
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perfect detection are possible. The results contradict the idea that network
security tends to decrease as the number of sensors increases.
Chapter 4: Secrecy Constrained Distributed Estimation in WSNs
In this chapter, we investigate the secrecy constrained distributed estimation
problem and the main contributions are summarized as follows:
1. Under classical settings, where the parameter to be estimated is fixed but
unknown, we analyze the estimation performance at the FC and eavesdropper
using Fisher information, respectively. In order to investigate the possibility of
perfect secrecy, we propose the Fisher information ratio between the FC and
eavesdropper. Furthermore, for Gaussian noise, we show how to design the
threshold in order to achieve asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect
estimation.
2. Under the Bayesian framework, where the parameter is a random variable,
we analyze the performance trade-off between the FC and eavesdropper using
Fisher information and show that the secrecy constraints can be satisfied for
both the FC and eavesdropper under Gaussian noise case.
Chapter 5: Secrecy Constrained Distributed Inference with Parallel Fading Binary
Symmetric Channel Models
In this chapter, we consider secrecy constrained detection and estimation prob-
lem with binary phase-shifting keying modulation in parallel Rayleigh fading binary
symmetric channels. Similarly, we investigate the performance ratio between the FC
and eavesdropper. We analyze the maximum achievable performance ratio and show
that the number of sensors does not affect this ratio.
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Chapter 6: We conclude in this chapter and discuss future research related to
secrecy constrained distributed inference.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND BASIC CONCEPTS
2.1 Statistical Inference
In the classical statistical inference, all the data is collected and processed in a
centralized fashion. Distributed inference, however, detects signal presence, estimates
parameters and tracks targets based on distributed data from local sensors [83, 86].
It has been the focus of multiple disciplinary research in the past several decades
[6, 10–12, 81, 85, 89]. One of the essential problems in distributed inference is to
optimize decision-making at the information center by the design of local decision
sensor rules for each sensor and global decision rules at an information center [83].
Without constraints on “distributed” settings, the problems of inference share much
in common with many centralized statistical inference and learning problems such as
signal detection and estimation, dimension reduction and feature extraction [60]. Due
to the additional condition on “distributed”, the complexity of the inference problem
is increased significantly [82].
Distributed inference includes distributed detection, distributed estimation and
tracking. One of the main differences between detection and estimation is the phe-
nomenon to be inferred by sensors. In distributed detection, the phenomenon ob-
served by sensors is discrete, e.g., binary hypothesis testing, where one aims to decide
between two potential hypotheses, H ∈ (H0, H1). In distributed estimation, the
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phenomenon is often a parameter in a continuous set [36]. In the following sections,
we introduce the basic settings in distributed detection and distributed estimation.
2.2 Distributed Detection
Hypotheses H
Sensor 1 Sensor 2
...
Sensor N
X1 X2 Xi
XN
Channel
Fusion Center
...
γ1 γ2 γi γN
Sensor i
...
Decision
...
U1 U2 Ui UN
V1 V2 Vi VN
V0
Figure 2.1: Distributed Detection
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As one of the essential aspects of distributed inference, distributed detection is
often the initial goal of a pattern recognition system and aims at detecting signals
or events as accurately as possible [86] with the distributed data collected by various
sensors, where the data can be generated from the underlying binary or M-ary
hypotheses. Distributed detection can be widely used for both military and civilian
applications including distributed array radar, intruder detection, anomaly detection
and intelligent transportation system where the infrastructure sensors detect pedes-
trians, vehicles and anomaly events [23, 42, 51]. For instance, N sensors are densely
deployed in forests to observe the temperatures, and through a channel, these nodes
send the quantized outputs to the FC where the final decision is made about whether
there is forest fire or not [69]. For WSNs, detecting the presence of an event is the
priority of all the other tasks including estimation, tracking and learning [11]. Hence,
as a key function in WSNs, distributed detection has been an important and active
research area over the past several decades [6, 10–12, 14, 77, 81, 85, 89].
In Figure 2.1, we show the structure of distributed detection in a parallel WSN,
where local sensors observe the hypotheses H and obtain their data Xi, (i = 1 . . . N).
With the decision rules for each sensor, γi, sensor i compresses the data to the outputs
Ui, which is transmitted across a channel. In the end, the FC makes the decision V0
based on the received Vis, the output of channels from the input Uis.
2.3 Distributed Estimation
If the presence of an object, a signal or an event is determined by the detection
function in WSNs, more complicated tasks such as estimation and tracking can be
performed. For instance, if a vehicle is detected by an intelligent transportation
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Parameter θ
Sensor 1 Sensor 2
...
Sensor N
X1 X2 Xi
XN
Channel
Fusion Center
...
γ1 γ2 γi γN
Sensor i
...
Estimated θˆ
...
U1 U2 Ui UN
V1 V2 Vi VN
Figure 2.2: Distributed Estimation
system, the following task would be estimating how fast the vehicle is moving and
where it is moving.
Aiming to estimate the values of a group of parameters based on a network
of collaborating sensors, distributed estimation has been an important and active
research area over the past several decades [9, 13, 27, 94].
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Similar to the distributed detection setting, in Figure 2.2, we present the structure
of distributed estimation, where sensors observe a scalar or vector parameter θ, sensors
quantized outputs Ui (i = 1 . . . N) are sent to the FC through a channel. Then the
parameter θˆ is estimated at the FC based upon received Vi.
2.4 Performance and Secrecy Metrics
From the aforementioned applications about distributed detection and distributed
estimation, we can see that the information collected by the systems is very sensitive
and care must be taken to prevent them from being leaked to any malicious third
parties. Hence, we focus on secrecy constrained inference in WSNs where the ultimate
goals are restricting the ability of eavesdropping from attackers and maintaining high
performance at the FC. Hence, we first introduce secrecy.
Secrecy in WSNs against eavesdropping attacks means that any malicious listeners
should not be able to make informative decisions based on messages from local sensors
that are supposed to go to the FC. In other words, in distributed inference, secrecy
measures the inference performance at the FC and eavesdropper respectively. For
instance, if the inference performance at the FC is higher than the specified level while
eavesdropper’s performance is lower than a random guess, the WSN is considered as
secure in terms of secrecy. For this purpose, we introduce the performance metrics
for distributed detection and distributed estimation, respectively, in this section.
2.4.1 Distributed Detection under Neyman-Pearson Framework: Infor-
mation Divergence
For secrecy constrained distributed detection under Neyman-Pearson framework, we
consider information divergence as the performance metric. Information divergence
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maps the dissimilarity between two probability distributions to nonnegative values.
It is also extended to machine learning problems where the goal is to minimize the
approximation error between the observed data and the approximated model [22].
There are several information divergences and they are summarized in Table 2.1,
where x > 0 is the observed data and µ is the approximation given by the model.
For γ-divergence and Re´nyi-divergence, the input data needs to be normalized, where
x˜i = xi/
∑
j xj and µ˜i = µi/
∑
j µj.
Since there are so many choices of information divergence, which one should we
consider? According to Stein’s lemma [12] and large deviation theory [8, 16], when
the decision center observations are i.i.d., the error exponent of probability of missed
detection (Pm) is bounded, a special case of γ-divergence, Kullback-Leibler divergence
(KLD), D(p0(·)||p1(·)), where p0, p1 are the pdf under H0 and H1 hypotheses, respec-
tively. Specifically, − lim
N→∞
1
N
logPm ≤ D(p0(·)||p1(·)) (N is the number of sensors in a
WSN) when the false alarm probability (Pf ) is constrained to be less than a constant,
and the equality can be achieved by the optimal LRT or other asymptotic optimal
detectors such as type based detectors so that [18],
Pm ≈ e−ND(p0(·)||p1(·)). (2.1)
For binary sensor decisions with P (Ui = 1;H0) = α and P (Ui = 1;H1) = β, we
have P (Ui = 0;H0) = 1−α and P (Ui = 0;H1) = 1− β, the KLD [44] for each sensor
is
D (p0||p1) = α log α
β
+ (1− α) log (1− α)
(1− β) = D (α, β) . (2.2)
It is also true when Pm is constrained to be a constant,
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Pf ≈ e−ND(p1(·)||p0(·)). (2.3)
The corresponding KLD is
D (p1||p0) = β log β
α
+ (1− β) log (1− β)
(1− α) = D (β, α) . (2.4)
2.4.2 Distributed Detection under Bayesian Framework: Probability of
Error
Under Bayesian framework, prior information needs to be taken into consideration.
Let the risk function λ(ai|Hj) be the risk or loss incurred for taking action ai when the
actual hypothesis is Hj, where i ∈ [0, . . . , N ], and N indicate the number of possible
actions, and j ∈ [0, . . . , C], C is the number of states of nature (categories) [24]. The
overall risk is
r =
N∑
i=0
C∑
j=0
λ (ai|Hj)P (ai|Hj)P (Hj),
where P (ai|Hj) is the probability of action i given the state of nature Hj, P (Hj) is the
probability of category Hj. For C = 1, two-category case, to simplify the notation,
let λij = λ (ai|Hj), P (Hj) = Pj and the actions be,
a0 : decide H0
a1 : decide H1
The overall risk is
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Table 2.1: Information Divergence [22]
Name Definition Special Cases
α-divergence
Dα (x||µ)
∑
i x
α
i µ
1−α
i −αxi+(α−1)µi
α(α−1)
Dα=2 (x||µ) = 12
∑
i
(xi−µi)2
µi
Dα→1 (x||µ) =
∑
i
(
xi ln
xi
µi
− xi + µi
)
Dα= 1
2
(x||µ) = 2∑i (√xi −√µi)2
Dα→0 (x||µ) =
∑
i
(
µi ln
µi
xi
− µi + xi
)
Dα=−1 (x||µ) = 12
∑
i
(xi−µi)2
xi
β-divergence
Dβ (x||µ)
∑
i x
β+1
i +βµ
β+1−(β+1)xiµβi
β(β+1)
Dβ=1 (x||µ) = 12
∑
i (xi − µi)2
Dβ→0 (x||µ) =
∑
i
(
xi ln
xi
µi
− xi + µi
)
Dβ→−1 (x||µ) =
∑
i
(
xi
µi
− ln xii
µi
− 1
)
Dβ=−2 (x||µ) =
∑
i
(
xi
2µ2i
− 1
µi
+ 1
2xi
)
γ-divergence
Dγ (x||µ)
1
γ(1 + γ)
ln
(∑
i
xγ+1i
)
+
1
(1 + γ)
ln
(∑
i
µγ+1i
)
− 1
γ
ln
(∑
i
xiµ
γ
i
) Dγ→0 (x˜||µ˜) =
∑
i x˜i ln
x˜i
µ˜i
Re´nyi-divergence
Dρ (x||µ)
1
ρ−1 ln
(∑
i x˜
p
i µ˜
1−p
i
)
where x˜i = xi/
∑
j xj,
µ˜i = µi/
∑
j µj
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r = λ00P (decide H0|H0)P0 + λ01P (decide H0|H1)P1+
λ10P (decide H1|H0)P0 + λ11P (decide H1|H1)P1
= λ00 (1− Pf )P0 + λ01PmP1 + λ10PfP0 + λ11 (1− Pm)P1
= λ00P0 + λ11P1 + (λ10 − λ00)PfP0 + (λ01 − λ11)PmP1
Since λ00P1 and λ11P0 are constant, we can put them aside. Therefore, the overall
risk function is reduced to
r = (λ10 − λ00)PfP0 + (λ01 − λ11)PmP1
Then we normalize r by
r
(λ10 − λ00)P0 + (λ01 − λ11)P1 =
(λ10 − λ00)P0
(λ10 − λ00)P0 + (λ01 − λ11)P1Pf
+
(λ01 − λ11)P1
(λ10 − λ00)P0 + (λ01 − λ11)P1Pm
Let
pi0 =
(λ10 − λ00)P0
(λ10 − λ00)P0 + (λ01 − λ11)P1
pi1 =
(λ01 − λ11)P1
(λ10 − λ00)P0 + (λ01 − λ11)P1 ,
we have
Pe = pi0Pf + pi1Pm (2.5)
With the detection performance KLD and probability of error, we can investigate
secrecy constrained detection in Chapter 3.
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2.4.3 Distributed Estimation under Classical Setting: Mean Squared Er-
ror and Fisher Information
For estimation problems under a classical setting, a natural criterion for evaluating
the performance is the mean squared error (MSE), which is defined in Equation (2.6).
MSE = E
(
θˆ − θ
)2
(2.6)
where, θ is a scalar parameter and θˆ is the estimated parameter. We will use MSE
evaluation as the performance metric when feasible.
However, sometimes computing MSE is not straightforward and even intractable
for some cases. Instead, Crame´r-Rao lower bound (CRLB) [39, 79] is often used which
is equivalent to evaluating the Fisher information (FI),
I(V; θ) , EV
(
∂2 log p(V; θ)
∂2θ
)
(2.7)
where V is the data transmitted from local sensors across the channel (Figure 2.2),
p(V; θ) is probability density function (PDF) of parameter θ given V [39]. And the
MSE is bounded away from CRLB for scalar parameter θ is,
MSE ≥ CRLB(V; θ) = 1
I(V; θ)
.
2.4.4 Distributed Estimation under Bayesian Setting: Bayesian Crame´r-
Rao Lower Bound
Under Bayesian framework, however, we have to take the prior information into
consideration, therefore, Bayesian CRLB is defined as,
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MSE ≥ BCRLBF (V; θ) = (I (V; θ))−1 =
(∫ ∞
−∞
NI(η, θ, ρF )p (θ) dθ + I(λ)
)−1
(2.8)
where
I(λ) =
∫ (
∂ log p (θ)
∂θ
)2
p(θ)dθ,
and V is the same with the one defined in (2.7) and p (θ) is the prior density about
the random variable θ.
Similarly, using estimation performance metrics, we can study the performance
trade-off, asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect estimation in Chapter
4.
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CHAPTER 3
SECRECY CONSTRAINED DISTRIBUTED DETECTION
IN WSNS
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we introduce
the system model, detection performance metric, and set the secrecy constraints
under both frameworks in WSNs, respectively. In Section 3.3, we solve the secrecy
constrained problem under Neyman-Pearson framework and explain how to achieve
asymptotic perfect secrecy in detection. We then analyze the secrecy constrained
distributed detection problem under the Bayesian framework in Section 3.4. In
Section 3.5, we provide simulation results to further support our proofs.
3.1 Distributed Detection in Sensor Networks
3.1.1 WSN Model
We consider a distributed detection problem with binary hypotheses, H0 and H1, in
a parallel WSN as shown in Figure 3.1. The key components of our research problem
are described as follows:
1. Network topology. The SN consists of N sensors connected in parallel to a
FC via a set of parallel accessible channels. Instead of considering a multi-hop
network, we adopt a parallel structure because even for a multi-hop network,
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Figure 3.1: The model of a parallel sensor network under the attacks of an
informed and greedy eavesdropper who eavesdrops on all the sensors de-
cisions (i = 1 . . . N) that are transmitted wirelessly via a binary symmetric
channel with bit error rate ρE,i. The legitimate user receives sensor i data
through another binary symmetric channel with bit error rate ρF,i < ρE,i.
the parallel structure can still be carried out virtually by leaving relay nodes to
forward all sensor outputs.
2. Sensor observations and sensor outputs. X = [X1, . . . , XN ] are the
sensor observation, for each Xi, can be a random variable or a random vector.
Next, pk(Xi) = p(Xi;Hk) is the probability density function (pdf) under Hk
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at sensor i, respectively, where k = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , N . We assume that
p0(Xi) and p1(Xi) are continuous pdfs with no point mass. The log-likelihood
ratio ln (p1(Xi)/p0(Xi)) is assumed to be unbounded. Sensor i makes a binary
decision Ui ∈ {0, 1} based on its decision rule γi, such that P (Ui = 1|Xi) =
γi(Xi) ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i.
3. Channel model. The communication channel between sensor i and its target
receiver is assumed to be a binary symmetric channel (BSC), a channel model
widely employed in SN communications for binary coding schemes such as
binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) [45, 71, 101]. This model also serves as a
good starting point to study other more complicated channel models. Sensor i
sends its quantized output Ui to the FC over a BSC with bit error rate (BER)
ρF,i <
1
2
, with a received decision, Vi.
4. Attack model. All of the sensors outputs are eavesdropped by Eve via a set
of parallel wiretapping channels. Eve receives Wi (i = 1, . . . , N), from sensor
i as an output of a BSC channel with BER ρE,i <
1
2
. We assume that Eve’s
channel is noisier than the FC’s such that ρE,i > ρF,i, which can be achieved by
using directional antennas to improve the FC SNR, resulting in a lower BER
[52, 75, 99]. Note, an analysis similar to what follows can be employed for
different channel models. Other than receiving a set of different observations
W = [W1, . . . ,WN ], Eve is assumed to have the same information about the
detection algorithm as the FC does, including the sensor observation model,
sensor decision rule, channel status and the prior probabilities of hypotheses,
P (H0) = pi0 and P (H1) = pi1.
5. Identical and conditional independence assumption. We assume that
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sensors observations and the communication channels are conditionally inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Specifically,
p(X1, X2, . . . , XN ;Hj) =
N∏
i=1
p(Xi;Hj), j = 0, 1,
for the sensor observations, and ρE = ρE,i with ρF = ρF,i for all i for the
communication channels.
3.1.2 Received Decision Qualities
For its simplicity and robustness, we employ identical sensor design in this chapter.
That is, the decision rule γi(·) at sensor i is a likelihood ratio quantizer such that
γi(x) = γ(x) =

1 p1(x)
p0(x)
≥ η
0 p1(x)
p0(x)
< η.
(3.1)
Under the conditional i.i.d. assumption, it has been shown that the identical sensor
decision rule design, where each sensor uses the same likelihood ratio test (LRT) with
the same threshold, is at least asymptotically optimal at the FC (i.e., no eavesdropper)
[17, 81, 93].
At the ith local sensor, the resulting probability of false alarm αi, and the proba-
bility of detection βi are given by [84]
αi = P (Ui = 1|H0) = P
(
p1 (Xi)
p0 (Xi)
≥ η|H0
)
,
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βi = P (Ui = 1|H1) = P
(
p1 (Xi)
p0 (Xi)
≥ η|H1
)
.
and
dβi
dαi
= η. (3.2)
Therefore, since ln (p1(Xi)/p0(Xi)) is unbounded, then η → ∞ as αi, βi → 0, or
η → 0 as αi, βi → 1. Because of the i.i.d. assumption on the observations, decision
rules and channels, we have
α = α1 = α2 · · · = αN
β = β1 = β2 · · · = βN .
Due to the binary symmetric channel between the local sensors and the FC, the
received decision, Vi, from sensor i at the FC, has the following performance,
P (Vi = 1|H0) = αF = α(1− ρF ) + (1− α)ρF
= ρF + (1− 2ρF )α,
P (Vi = 1|H1) = βF = β(1− ρF ) + (1− β)ρF
= ρF + (1− 2ρF )β.
(3.3)
Similarly, the received decision, Wi, at eavesdropper, has the following perfor-
mance,
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P (Wi = 1|H0) = αE = ρE + (1− 2ρE)α,
P (Wi = 1|H1) = βE = ρE + (1− 2ρE)β.
(3.4)
3.2 Secrecy in Distributed Detection
With the model of the WSN, we introduce the performance metrics that lead to
secrecy constraints in distributed detection under both frameworks. The first perfor-
mance metric applicable under the Neyman-Pearson framework is the KLD.
3.2.1 Performance Metric and Secrecy Constraints under Neyman-Pearson
framework
When the decision center’s observations are i.i.d. and the probability of false alarm,
Pf = (decide H1|H0), is constrained to be no greater than a fixed constant, it is known
that the error exponent of the probability of missed-detection, Pm = (decide H0|H1),
is bounded by the corresponding KLD, D (p0(·)||p1(·)) [44], between the p0, the pdf
under H0, and p1, the pdf under H1, such that [8, 12, 16]
− lim
N→∞
1
N
lnPm ≤ D (p0(·)||p1(·)) = Ep0(·)
(
dp0(·)
dp1(·)
)
(3.5)
Notice that equality in (3.5) can be achieved via optimal LRT detectors or other
asymptotically optimal detectors such as type based detectors [18]. Similarly, D (p1(·)||p0(·))
is the error exponent rate for Pf when Pm is constrained to be no more than a certain
threshold.
For binary sensor decisions with P (Ui = 1|H0) = α¯ and P (Ui = 1|H1) = β¯, we
have P (Ui = 0|H0) = 1 − α¯ and P (Ui = 0|H1) = 1 − β¯, the KLD at the decision
center for one sensor is
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D
(
α¯, β¯
)
, α¯ ln α¯
β¯
+ (1− α¯) ln 1− α¯
1− β¯ , (3.6)
where α¯ and β¯ are generic notations of probability of false alarm and probability of
detection, respectively, for both the FC and eavesdropper.
The KLD is always non-negative and equals 0 if and only if α¯ = β¯. Similarly, for
a bounded Pm, the error exponent of Pf decays exponentialy in the number of sensors
at the rate of D
(
β¯, α¯
)
such that Pf ∝ e−ND(β¯,α¯), where,
D
(
β¯, α¯
)
, β¯ ln β¯
α¯
+
(
1− β¯) ln 1− β¯
1− α¯ . (3.7)
For example, the KLD of each received sensor decision Vi at the FC is Di (αF , βF )
with αF , βF defined in Equation (3.3) and KLD of each received sensor decisions Wi at
the eavesdropper is Di (αE, βE). Owing to i.i.d. condition, Di (αF , βF ) = D (αF , βF ),
Di (αE, βE) = D (αE, βE), and the KLD at the FC and at eavesdropper for all N are,
DF =
N∑
i=1
Di (αF , βF ) = ND (αF , βF ) ,
DE =
N∑
i=1
Di (αE, βE) = ND (αE, βE) ,
(3.8)
respectively.
The detection performance in terms of the probability of missed-detection at the
FC and at eavesdropper decays exponentially such that
Pm,F ∝ e−DF ,
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and
Pm,E ∝ e−DE .
Therefore, to limit eavesdropper’s detectability, one needs to make DE as small
as possible, and DF as large as possible, to maximize the FC detection performance,
which leads to the following secrecy constraints.
Secrecy Constraints under the Neyman-Pearson framework
DE = ND (αE, βE) ≤ TE,
DF = ND (αF , βF ) ≥ TF ,
(3.9)
where TE and TF are the KLD thresholds for eavesdropper and the FC, respectively,
and DE and DF are defined in Equation (3.8).
• Feasibility: Is it possible to design a sensor network for the targeted TE and
TF ?
• Secrecy and detection trade-off: minimize TE under fixed TF or maximize
TF under fixed TE. For non-asymptotic cases, we want the detectability at
eavesdropper to be as low as possible and the detection performance at the FC
to be as high as possible. However, in practice, a performance trade-off between
the FC and eavesdropper must be considered.
• Asymptotic perfect secrecy: TE → 0 as the number of sensors, N → ∞,
for example, TE ∝ N−µ, 0 < µ < 1. In this case, eavesdropper’s detection
capability diminishes as N increases.
• Asymptotic perfect detection: TF →∞ as the number of sensors, N →∞.
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3.2.2 Performance Metric and Secrecy Constraints under Bayesian frame-
work
To measure the detection performance under Bayesian framework, we consider the
overall probability of error, Pe,
Pe = pi0Pf + pi1Pm, (3.10)
where pi0 and pi1 = 1 − pi0 are known to both the FC and an informed and greedy
eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, we assume pi1 ≤ 12 ≤ pi0, which is known by
both the FC and eavesdropper. Note, pi0 and pi1 = 1− pi0 are the prior probabilities
of H0 and H1, respectively.
Thus, for the binary hypotheses testing problem secrecy constraint, the goal is to
minimize the probability of error at the FC and to increase the Pe at eavesdropper
as much as possible. We formulate the optimization problem as follows:
Secrecy Constraints under Bayesian framework
Pe,E ≥ ΘE
Pe,F ≤ ΘF ,
(3.11)
where Pe,E and Pe,F are the probability of error for eavesdropper and the FC respec-
tively, and ΘE and ΘF are the probability of error thresholds for eavesdropper and
the FC, respectively.
• Secrecy and detection trade-off: ΘE = min(pi0, pi1) = pi1 and min{ΘF}. Here, we
desire to constrain the detection performance at eavesdropper to a level where
she can only use the prior information, and maximize the performance at the
FC.
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• Asymptotic perfect secrecy: ΘE → min(pi0, pi1) = pi1 and Pe,E → min(pi0, pi1) =
pi1 as N → ∞. In this case, observations do not provide any useful or critical
information and all that eavesdropper can do is rely on the prior information
and decide H0 regardless of any Wi. Similar to the perfect secrecy constraint,
as the number of sensors increases, eavesdropper receives vanishingly useful
information from the observations.
• Asymptotic perfect detection: ΘF → 0 as N →∞.
Knowing the secrecy definition and constraints, we will now solve the optimization
problems in the following sections.
3.3 Performance Analysis Under Neyman-Pearson Frame-
work
3.3.1 Maximum Achievable Performance
In order to analyze the detection performance at both the FC and eavesdropper, as
well as the performance trade-offs, we derive the following approximated KLD at the
receiver with BER, ρ¯ (a generic notation of BER for both the FC and eavesdropper),
when the sensors operate in the vicinity of the extreme points, i.e., if the local sensors
log-likelihood ratio ln ((p1(x)/p0(x)) is unbounded, (α, β) ≈ (0, 0) or (α, β) ≈ (1, 1)
in Table 3.1. Detailed proofs and analysis are shown in Appendix A.
42
Table 3.1: Approximated KLD
(α, β) ≈ (0, 0) (α, β) ≈ (1, 1)
ρ¯ = 0
D(α¯, β¯) β (1− α)
(
ln 1−α
1−β − 1
)
D(β¯, α¯) β
(
ln β
α
− 1) 1− α
ρ¯ > 0
D(α¯, β¯) 1
2
β2(1−2ρ¯)2
(1−ρ¯)ρ¯
1
2
(1−α)2(1−2ρ¯)2
(1−ρ¯)ρ¯
D(β¯, α¯) 1
2
β2(1−2ρ¯)2
(1−ρ¯)ρ¯
1
2
(1−α)2(1−2ρ¯)2
(1−ρ¯)ρ¯
3.3.2 Noiseless Channel at the FC, where, ρE > 0 and ρF = 0
Based on the defined secrecy constraints and Table 3.1, we investigate two different
scenarios for the FC; one is when the channel is perfect, the other is with an imperfect
channel.
For N i.i.d sensors with total KLD at eavesdropper is constrained at TE by,
DE = ND (αE, βE) = TE. (3.12)
Since ρE 6= 0 and from Equation (A.3), we approximate the threshold at eavesdropper,
N
2
β2 (1− 2ρE)2
(1− ρE) ρE ≈ TE.
Therefore, at all the sensors, the operating point should be
β ≈
√
2TE (1− ρE) ρE
N (1− 2ρE)2
, (3.13)
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which indeed goes to 0 as TE/N → 0. Because ρF = 0, from Equation (3.3) and
(A.4), it can be shown that the per sensor KLD is
D (αF , βF ) ≈ β ≈
√
2TE (1− ρE) ρE
N (1− 2ρE)2
,
and the total KLD is
DF = ND (αF , βF ) ≈ Nβ
≈
√
2NTE (1− ρE) ρE
(1− 2ρE)2
.
(3.14)
This can be utilized to design the secrecy against eavesdropper and the detection
performance at the FC. For example, if we let TE be N
−µ, (0 < µ < 1), which results
in β ≈
√
2N−µ(1−ρE)ρE
N(1−2ρE)2 , then
DF ≈ N
1−µ
2
√
2 (1− ρE) ρE
(1− 2ρE)2
.
Therefore, the performance and secrecy of the SN improves as the increment of
the number of sensors, N , such that,

DE ∝ N−µ
DF ∝ N 1−µ2 ,
(3.15)
when µ ≈ 0, eavesdropper’s performance is constant, the performance at the FC
improves at the order of
√
N ; when µ ≈ 1, the FC has a guaranteed performance,
eavesdropper’s performance diminishes at the order of 1/N . when N →∞, DF →∞,
which results in asymptotic perfect detection [18] at the FC and DE → 0, asymptotic
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perfect secrecy. We summarize the findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Asymptotic Perfect Secrecy and Asymptotic Perfect Detec-
tion under Neyman-Pearson Framework: When eavesdropper has a noisy
channel, ρE > 0, and the FC has a noiseless channel, ρF = 0, the secrecy constraints
(DE ≤ TE; DF ≥ TF ) can be satisfied for any arbitrary constants TE and TF , given a
sufficiently large number of sensors, N.
3.3.3 Noisy Channel, where, ρF > 0 and ρE > 0
Rarely does a perfect communication channel exist in practice, so we investigate the
case where the FC has a noisy channel. Since ρF 6= 0, from Table 3.1, we know that
D (αF , βF ) ≈ 1
2
β2 (1− 2ρE)2
(1− ρE) ρE .
Under the secrecy constraint in Equation (3.9), after applying β from Equation (3.13),
we obtain
DF ≈ TEρE(1− ρE)(1− 2ρF )
2
ρF (1− ρF )(1− 2ρE)2 . (3.16)
To measure the performance trade-off, we define the KLD ratio between the FC and
eavesdropper as,
R =
DF
DE
=
D (αF , βF )
D (αE, βE)
=
D (βF , αF )
D (βE, αE)
(3.17)
Therefore, if we plug Equation (3.16) into Equation (3.17), we have the following
result for the performance trade-off between the FC and eavesdropper.
Theorem 2. Maximum Achievable Performance Trade-off under Neyman-
Pearson Framework When both eavesdropper and the FC have noisy channels,
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ρF > 0 and ρE > 0, the secrecy constraints can only be achieved for certain TE and
TF such that TF/TE is no more than the ratio, R =
(1−ρE)ρE
(1−ρF )ρF
(
1−2ρF
1−2ρE
)2
.
(See Appendix B for the detailed proof).
For example, if ρF = 0.1, ρE = 0.3, and the required DF > 10, the resulting infor-
mation leakage is DE > 1.07. In other words, the information leakage is inevitable, no
matter how one increases the number of sensors in the network. On the other hand,
when ρF is much smaller than ρE by using the techniques mentioned in [32–34, 99],
then the performance ratio can still be large enough to maintain high detectability
at the FC and poor performance at eavesdropper. This point is expanded upon in
Section 3.5. The ratio can also serve as a performance design protocol for the SN, for
instance, the desired performance at the FC and at eavesdropper are TF and TE, we
can compute the corresponding ρF when ρE is fixed or the other way round.
3.4 Performance Analysis Under Bayesian Framework
Recall that the goal under Bayesian framework is to minimize the probability of error
in Equation (3.10) at the FC and constrain that at eavesdropper at a certain level.
3.4.1 Detection Performance Trade-off under Perfect Secrecy Constraint
Since both the FC and eavesdropper know the exact prior probabilities and pi0 ≥ pi1,
the detection eavesdroppers probability of error bound is pi1 achieved by accepting
H0 regardless of the observations. The constraints on eavesdropper are that obser-
vations should not be of any help in her decision making ability and the Pe,E at the
eavesdropper should remain at pi1. When this is true, eavesdropper still makes the
decision H0 regardless of the observations Wi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . That means,
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P (H1|W ) ≤ P (H0|W ), ∀Wi
=⇒ P (W |H1)pi1 ≤ P (W |H0)pi0, ∀Wi
=⇒ p(W |H1)
p(W |H0) ≤
pi0
pi1
∀Wi
=⇒ argmax
W
(
p(W |H1)
p(W |H0)
)
≤ pi0
pi1
∀Wi.
The maximum of the LRT is achieved when W1 = W2 = · · · = WN = 1 such that
max
(
p(W |H1)
p(W |H0)
)
= (βE/αE)
N with αE and βE defined in Equation (3.4). That is, in
order to limit eavesdropper’s detectability to the prior information,
(
βE
αE
)N
≤ pi0
pi1
. (3.18)
In this case, the wirelessly tapped sensors observations can provide some information,
but not enough to overcome the prior information to make any difference in the final
decision making.
Meanwhile, for the performance at the FC, we derive the following theorem,
Theorem 3. Maximum Achievable Performance Trade-off under Bayesian
Framework When the FC has a noiseless channel and eavesdropper has a noisy
channel, 0 < ρE < 0.5, the minimum achievable Pe,F at the FC is given by ,
limN→∞ Pe,F = Pfpi0 = pi1
(
pi0
pi1
)− ρE
1−2ρE .
Pe,F is a function of prior probabilities and the eavesdropper’s channel qualities
ρE, and it is also strictly greater than 0 for any ρE < 0.5. The details of proofs are
shown in Appendix C.
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Remark 1. When pi0 = pi1 = 0.5, then Pe,F = 0.5, that means, it is impossible to
achieve perfect secrecy, while providing the FC with any useful information.
For the case that the FC does not have a perfect channel, where ρF > 0, the
detection performance becomes worse, and the corresponding probability of error at
the FC increases as well.
3.4.2 Asymptotic Perfect Secrecy and Asymptotic Perfect Detection
We know that asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect detection can be
achieved under N-P framework from Theorem 1, here we investigate the same problem
under the Bayesian framework, requiring
Pe,E → min (pi0, pi1) , N →∞.
To evaluate the asymptotic error rate, we need to establish the error decay rate
bound for the FC and eavesdropper respectively. First, from large deviation theory,
for any decision center with conditionally i.i.d., Bernoulli observations Yi with P (Yi =
1|H0) = α¯ and P (Yi = 1|H1) = β¯, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the decision rule is
∑N
i=1 Yi
N
H1
≷
H0
T.
Based on the work in [16] and the Chernoff inequality
Pf ≈ e−ND(T,α¯),
Pm ≈ e−ND(T,β¯),
where T is the decision rule threshold. Notice that
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max (lnPf + ln pi0, lnPm + ln pi1) ≤ lnPe,
lnPe ≤ max (lnPf + ln pi0, lnPm + ln pi1) + ln 2.
(3.19)
Hence, for a sufficiently large N ,
− lnPe
N
≈ min
(
− lnPf
N
,− lnPm
N
)
,
≈ min (D(T, α¯), D(T, β¯)) . (3.20)
Therefore, the optimal T for large N is chosen such that D(T, α¯) = D(T, β¯). In
Appendix D, we show that
T =
D(α¯, β¯)β¯ +D(β¯, α¯)α¯
D(β¯, α¯) +D(α¯, β¯)
, (3.21)
which reveals the relationship between T and the KLD distances D(α¯, β¯) and D(β¯, α¯).
Table 3.2: Decision Rule Threshold T
(α, β) ≈ (0, 0) (α, β) ≈ (1, 1)
ρ¯ = 0 β−α
ln β
α
+ α β + α−β
ln 1−α
1−β
ρ¯ > 0 α¯+β¯
2
= ρ¯+ (1−ρ¯)(α+β)
2
α¯+β¯
2
= ρ¯+ (1−ρ¯)(α+β)
2
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By plugging the decision rule threshold into the approximated KLD in Table 3.1,
we summarize the approximated asymptotic error exponent in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Approximated Asymptotic Error Exponent
(α, β) ≈ (0, 0) (α, β) ≈ (1, 1)
ρ¯ = 0
(
β−α
ln β
α
+ α
)
ln
(
β−α
α ln β
α
) (
1− β − α−β
ln 1−α
1−β
)
ln
(
α−β
(1−β) ln 1−α
1−β
)
ρ¯ > 0 1
8
β2(1−2ρ¯)2
(1−ρ¯)ρ¯
1
8
(1−α)2(1−2ρ¯)2
(1−ρ¯)ρ¯
According to Table 3.3, when (α, β)→ (0, 0) and ρF > 0, the asymptotic error rate
at FC can be approximated as β
2(1−2ρF )2
8ρF (1−ρF ) . Similarly, for eavesdropper with ρE > 0,
the error exponent D (TE, αE) = D (TE, βE) ≈ β2(1−2ρE)28ρE(1−ρE) . Since Pe,E ∝ e−ND(TE ,βE),
in order to achieve the asymptotic perfect secrecy under the Bayesian settings, it is
required that
Nβ2(1− 2ρE)2 → 0, N →∞ =⇒ β = o
(√
N−1
)
, (3.22)
where f = o(g) denotes that function f grows strictly slower than function g, whereas
f = O(g) means f grows slower than or equal to g.
Meanwhile, when the FC channel is noise free and (α, β) → (0, 0), we have
TF =
β−α
ln β
α
+ α and the resulting asymptotic error exponent D(TF , α) = D(TF , β) ≈(
β−α
ln β
α
+ α
)
ln
(
β−α
α ln β
α
)
= o(β). Hence, Pe,F ∝ e−Nβ. With the constraint of asymptotic
perfect secrecy (3.22), we know that Nβ = O
(√
N
)
, i.e., the probability of error at
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the FC decays no faster than e−
√
N . In practical applications, β can be chosen as
c(1/(
√
N lnN)), where c is a constant. This result leads to Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Asymptotic Perfect Secrecy and Asymptotic Perfect Detec-
tion under Bayesian Framework When eavesdropper has a noisy channel, ρE > 0
and the FC has a noiseless channel, ρF = 0, the secrecy constraint (Pe,E ≥ ΘE,
Pe,F ≤ ΘF ,) can be satisfied for any arbitrary constants ΘE < min (P (H0), P (H1))
and ΘF > 0 given a sufficiently large number of sensors, N.
In summary, we showed that under Bayesian framework, eavesdropper’s detectabil-
ity can be limited to the level where she can only rely on the prior information, but
this induces a performance cost at the FC. Additionally, it was shown that both
asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect detection are possible.
3.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we compare the detection performance at eavesdropper and the FC
via the canonical distributed detection problem of a constant signal with zero mean
additive white Gaussian noise. Specifically, the sensor observations are given by

H1 : Xi = A+ Zi
H0 : Xi = Zi,
where Zi ∼ N (0, 1) is the normalized observation noise following a standard Gaus-
sian distribution, A > 0 is a fixed constant signal to be detected with signal-to-
noise ratio, SNR = 20 log10A dB. In this setting, the sensor log-likelihood ratio
ln (p1(xi)/p0(xi)) = Ax− A22 , is unbounded from above and below, and the detection
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probability is given by β(α) = Q(Q−1(α)− A), where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp(−u2
2
)du is
the tail probability of a standard Gaussian distribution.
3.5.1 Simulations under Neyman-Pearson Framework
We first examine the system secrecy when the FC has a non-perfect channel, ρF > 0
and ρE > 0. The upper figures of Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, show the performance
comparison between the FC and eavesdropper in terms of KLD for both cases, D(α¯, β¯)
and D(β¯, α¯) when N = 1, SNR = 0 dB (A = 1), ρF = 0.01, and ρE = 0.35. The
bottom figures show the ratio between KLD at the FC and KLD at eavesdropper for
one sensor. In this case, the maximum achievable KLD ratio defined in Equation
(3.17), R = 250 and the marker star in the bottom figure indicates the actual
maximum ratio. We can see that when probability of false alarm, α, is close to 0
or 1, the ratio D(αF , βF )/D(αE, βE) = D(βF , αF )/D(βE, αE) and they are close to
the theoretical value in Theorem 2, which is represented by the horizontal line in
each figure. Given the secrecy constraint such that DE ≤ TE is bounded, then the
maximum achievable DF ≤ RTE is also bounded, however, since ρF is small here, the
ratio R is still a large number, which reflects the detection performance gap between
eavesdropper and the FC. In other words, this ratio can be utilized in sensor network
design to improve secrecy at the physical-layer.
In order to show the achievable asymptotic perfect detection at the FC and
asymptotic zero detection at eavesdropper, we compare the detection performance
at eavesdropper and the FC in terms of their KLDs for all N sensors, DE and DF ,
which are under the conditions that SNR = 0 dB, ρF = 0, ρE = 0.35 and we set
DE → 0.1√N , which is monotone decreasing in N . From Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5,
the trends of KLDs at the FC and KLD at eavesdropper show that both asymptotic
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Figure 3.2: The maximum achievable detection performance trade-off
under Neyman-Pearson framework using KLD for one sensor.
perfect detection and asymptotic perfect secrecy are possible by increasing the number
of sensors. In the figure, D˜F and D˜E denote the approximated KLDs at the FC and
at eavesdropper, respectively, where D˜F is computed using Equation (3.14). We can
see that the approximated KLDs approach to the actual KLDs for both cases when
(α, β)→ (0, 0) and (α, β)→ (1, 1).
ROC curves shown in Figure 3.6, are obtained under the same settings in Figure
3.4 with 10 and 50 sensors. The corresponding eavesdropper curves are approaching
a diagonal line which implies no detectability. When the number of sensors is 50, the
corresponding detection performance of the FC is almost perfect. The ROC curves
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Figure 3.3: The maximum achievable detection performance trade-off
under Neyman-Pearson framework using KLD for one sensor.
show again that asymptotic perfect secrecy can be achieved by increasing the number
of sensors and adjusting sensor optimality points accordingly.
3.5.2 Simulations under Bayesian Framework
Under Bayesian framework, we illustrate the secrecy and detection performance trade-
off with relative to the total number of sensors, N , in Figure 3.7. We set pi0 and
pi1 as 0.7 and 0.3 respectively, SNR = 3 dB, and ρE = 0.3, ρF = 0. From the
figure, we can see that the simulated data approaches the FC theoretical probability
of error value of 0.159, computed using Theorem 3. Meanwhile, the probability of
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Figure 3.4: When (α, β) ≈ (0,0), the asymptotic secrecy and detection
performance using approximated and actual KLD (D(α¯, β¯)) at the FC and
at eavesdropper for N sensors. DF and DE denote the actual KLDs at the
FC and at eavesdropper, respectively. D˜F and D˜E denote the approximated
KLDs at the FC and at eavesdropper, respectively.
error at eavesdropper remains fixed at pi1 = 0.3. In other words, the detectability of
eavesdropper is constrained at her prior information and observations do not improve
her decision-making. Meanwhile, the detection performance at the FC does not exceed
the bound derived in Theorem 3.
For asymptotic performance analysis, we first plot the asymptotic error exponent
for the FC with noiseless channels in Figure 3.8, the SNR and prior probabilities
are the same with the ones in Figure 3.7. Meanwhile, the sensor’s probability of
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Figure 3.5: When (α, β) ≈ (1,1), the asymptotic secrecy and detection
performance using approximated and actual KLD (D(α¯, β¯)) at the FC and
at eavesdropper for N sensors. DF and DE denote the actual KLDs at the
FC and at eavesdropper, respectively. D˜F and D˜E denote the approximated
KLDs at the FC and at eavesdropper, respectively.
detection is selected as β = 1.5√
N lnN
, and the corresponding probability of false alarm
is α = Q (Q−1(β) + A). We can see the estimated error exponent of the FC in Figure
3.8, approaches the actual error exponent when the number of sensors is 100.
We then plot the probability of error for the FC and eavesdropper in Figure
3.9 under the above conditions and ρE = 0.35. As the number of sensors increase,
probability of error for eavesdropper stays at pi1, which means the reported sensor
observations do not improve eavesdroppers detection ability. As for the FC, the
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Figure 3.6: ROC curves for the FC and eavesdropper with different
number of sensors in N-P. The random guess line implies zero detectability.
eavesdropper’s detectability is getting closer and closer to the diagonal
line.
probability of error quickly diminishes to zero with a few hundred sensors. In other
words, asymptotic perfect secrecy is possible under Bayesian framework.
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CHAPTER 4
SECRECY CONSTRAINED DISTRIBUTED
ESTIMATION IN WSNS
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we introduce the estimation
system model with secrecy constraints and in 4.2, we introduce estimation perfor-
mance metric, FI and explain how to achieve asymptotic perfect secrecy. We continue
analyzing the case where the parameter is fixed but unknown and the observation
noise follows Gaussian distribution in Section 4.3. For Bayesian cases where the
parameter is a random variable, we show that the secrecy constraints for the FC and
eavesdropper can be satisfied as well in Section 4.4. Simulation results are provided
to further support our proofs in Section 4.5.
4.1 Distributed Estimation Model
The parallel WSN model with a global and greedy eavesdropper who has access to all
sensors outputs is shown in Figure 4.1, where sensors observe parameter θ, quantize
their observations, then send them to the FC across channels. In many applications,
the sensors are deployed to monitor the environment. In such scenarios, the sensor
observations can often be assumed to be conditionally independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) given the underlying parameter θ. Under this assumption, the
sensor observations X = [X1, X2, . . . , XN ] can be written as follows,
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Figure 4.1: Parallel sensor network model under eavesdropper attack, who
eavesdrops on the output of sensor i, transmitted wirelessly via a binary
symmetric channel with bit error rate ρE,i. The FC receives sensor i data
through another binary symmetric channel with bit error rate ρF,i < ρE,i.
f(X|θ) =
N∏
i=1
f(Xi|θ),
where f(X|θ) and f(Xi|θ) are known probability density functions (pdfs) and Xi is
the observation of sensor i.
We consider the estimation problem, where the ith sensor observation Xi is,
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Xi = θ + Zi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (4.1)
where Zi is an additive i.i.d zero mean observation noise with pdf f(·). Due to
the bandwidth constraint between local sensors and the FC, we assume the Xi are
quantized to a single bit of compressed data, Ui, via the quantization rule
Ui =

1, Xi > ηi
0, Xi ≤ ηi
∀i, (4.2)
where the threshold, ηi, is fixed and known to both the FC and eavesdropper. To
reduce the system complexity and improve system robustness, we assume that the
sensors employ identical quantization rules such that η1 = η2 = · · · = ηN = η.
Because the sensors observations are conditionally i.i.d., we have
Pr(Ui = 1|θ) = β = Pr(θ + Zi > η) = Q(η − θ),
Pr(Ui = 0|θ) = 1− β = 1− Pr(Ui = 1|θ),
where Q(t) =
∫∞
t
fZ(x)dx is the complementary distribution function of Z.
The communication channels between sensors and the receivers are assumed to be
BSCs. Sensor i sends decision Ui to the FC over a BSC with BER ρF,i <
1
2
, with the
received decision Vi. All of the sensors outputs are eavesdropped by eavesdropper via
a set of parallel wiretapping channels. eavesdropper receives Wi, from sensor i as an
output of a separate BSC channel with BER ρE,i <
1
2
. We assume that eavesdropper’s
channel is noisier than the FC’s such that ρE,i > ρF,i [32, 99]. Assuming that the
63
sensors are within similar distances to eavesdropper and the FC, then the channels
can be assumed to be independent and identical, i.e., ρF = ρF,1 = · · · = ρF,N and
ρE = ρE,1 = · · · = ρE,N .
As a result, the observations at the FC and eavesdropper possess the following
quality,
Pr(Vi = 1|θ) = (1− 2ρF ) Pr(Ui = 1|θ) + ρF ,
Pr(Wi = 1|θ) = (1− 2ρE) Pr(Ui = 1|θ) + ρE.
For the purposes of this chapter we analyze identical channels, although non-
identical channels can be treated in a similar fashion.
4.2 Estimation Performance and Asymptotic Perfect Secrecy
under Classical Setting
We now evaluate the estimation performance at the FC and eavesdropper under
a classical setting, using the widely employed Mean Squared Error (MSE) metric
under some wild conditions [15, 39]. The Crame´r-Rao inequality given observations
V = [V1, . . . , VN ]
T and known quantization rules [84, 87], establishes a MSE lower
bound for any unbiased estimator of θˆF , F such that ,
F , E
(
θˆF − θ
)2
≥ CRLB(V; θ) = 1
I(V; θ)
, (4.3)
where CRLB is Crame´r-Rao lower bound [39] and I(V; θ) is the FI, given by,
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I(V; θ) , EV
[(
∂ log p(V; θ)
∂θ
)2]
(a)
=
N∑
i=1
EVi
[(
∂ log p(Vi; θ)
∂θ
)2]
(b)
= NI(η, θ, ρF ),
where p(V; θ) is the pdf of parameter θ given V [39]. Note, (a) and (b) follow from the
sensors observations conditionally i.i.d property, the identical channels assumption,
and
I(η, θ, ρ) =
f 2(η − θ)(1− 2ρ)2
(ρ+ (1− 2ρ)Q(η − θ))(1− ρ− (1− 2ρ)Q(η − θ)) (4.4)
is the per sensor FI when the sensor observation is received over a BSC with BER ρ.
Similarly, at eavesdropper with W = [W1, . . . ,WN ]
T , the MSE lower bound, E,
for any unbiased estimator θˆE is
E , E
(
θˆE − θ
)2
≥ CRLB(W; θ)
=
1
I(W; θ)
=
1
NI(η, θ, ρE)
.
4.2.1 Fisher Information Ratio
Based on the CRLB, the secrecy design problems can be framed as maximizing the FI
at the FC while minimizing the FI at eavesdropper. Therefore, we introduce the FI
ratio R as an intermediate step to achieve these secrecy requirements, with a higher
R indicating a better secrecy. The FI ratio is defined as follows,
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R(η, θ) , I(η, θ, ρF )
I(η, θ, ρE)
=
(1− 2ρF )2(ρE + (1− 2ρE)Q(η − θ))
(1− 2ρE)2(ρF + (1− 2ρF )Q(η − θ))
× (1− ρE − (1− 2ρE)Q(η − θ))
(1− ρF − (1− 2ρF )Q(η − θ))
=
(
ρE
1−2ρE +Q(η − θ)
)(
1−ρE
1−2ρE −Q(η − θ)
)
(
ρF
1−2ρF +Q(η − θ)
)(
1−ρF
1−2ρF −Q(η − θ)
)
=
−Q2(η − θ) +Q(η − θ) + ρE(1−ρE)
(1−2ρE)2
−Q2(η − θ) +Q(η − θ) + ρF (1−ρF )
(1−2ρF )2
= 1 +
ρE(1−ρE)
(1−2ρE)2 −
ρF (1−ρF )
(1−2ρF )2
−Q2(η − θ) +Q(η − θ) + ρF (1−ρF )
(1−2ρF )2
= 1 +
ρE(1−ρE)
(1−2ρE)2 −
ρF (1−ρF )
(1−2ρF )2
− (Q(η − θ)− 1
2
)2
+ 1
4
+ ρF (1−ρF )
(1−2ρF )2
.
(4.5)
Notice that the function ρ(1−ρ)
(1−2ρ)2 is a monotone increasing function for ρ < 0.5, and
since ρF < ρE <
1
2
, then ρE(1−ρE)
(1−2ρE)2 −
ρF (1−ρF )
(1−2ρF )2 > 0. Therefore, R(η, θ) is a decreasing
function of Q(η − θ) when Q(η − θ) ∈ (0, 0.5] and increasing function of Q(η − θ)
when Q(η − θ) ∈ [0.5, 1). The supremum of the FI ratio,
sup(R) =
ρE(1− ρE)(1− 2ρF )2
ρF (1− ρF )(1− 2ρE)2 , (4.6)
is achieved when Q(η − θ) approaches to 0 or 1. However, such choices of Q are not
desirable in that they result in f(η − θ) = −dQ(η−θ)
dη
= 0 and further the FI at the
FC, NI(θ, η, ρF )=0, indicating that the FC does not obtain any useful information
for estimation either. Nevertheless, as R is a continuous function of Q, to achieve
the design goal, we can choose Q(η − θ) close to 0 or 1 and increase the number of
sensors N . In other words, we need to design η and N jointly to realize maximum
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achievable performance at the FC and secrecy against eavesdropper. Meanwhile, we
discuss the minimized FI ratio in Appendix E.
Also notice that the FI ratio limit in Equation (4.6) is exactly the same with the
KLD ratio derived in distributed detection in Section 3.3.3.
4.2.2 Asymptotic Perfect Secrecy
In order to achieve APS against eavesdropper, we require
I(W; θ) = NI(η, θ, ρE)→ 0, N →∞. (4.7)
Naturally, we also require the WSN to have an asymptotic perfect estimation at
the FC, i.e.,
I(V; θ) = NI(η, θ, ρE)→∞, N →∞. (4.8)
Notice that when the FC has noiseless channels such that ρF = 0, the maximum FI
ratio sup(R) =∞, indicating it is possible to simultaneously achieve both asymptotic
perfect estimation and asymptotic perfect secrecy by choosing the appropriate η as a
function of N . Next, we demonstrate how to do so for the case where the observation
noises are Gaussian distributed, with similar design approaches employed for other
noise distributions.
4.3 Estimation in Gaussian Noise under Classical Settings
We now consider the case where the observation noise, Zi, follows the standard
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance, where f(x) = 1√
2pi
e
−x
2 .
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According to the bounds on Mills ratio [70], x + 1 > f(x)
Q(x)
> x, for x > 0, we
have
f(x)
xQ(x)
→ 1, as x→∞. (4.9)
For the FC with noiseless channel, the total FI is
I (V; θ) ∝ N(η − θ)f(η − θ)
= N(η − θ) 1√
2pi
e
−(η−θ)2
2 .
For the noisy eavesdropper, the corresponding FI is
I (W; θ) ∝ Nf 2(η − A)
= N
(
1
2pi
e
−(η−θ)2
2
)2
.
By choosing η =
√
(1 + µ) logN , where η  θ and µ ∈ [0, 1], for a fixed but
unknown θ, and N sufficiently large, e
−(η−θ)2
2 ∝ N− 1+µ2 .
For the FC,
I (V; θ) ∝ N
√
(1 + µ) logN N−
1+µ
2
= N
1−µ
2
√
(1 + µ) logN.
(4.10)
For eavesdropper,
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I (W; θ) ∝ N
(
N−
1+µ
2
)2
= N−µ.
(4.11)
Now, the problem becomes how to choose µ such that I(V; θ)→∞ for asymptotic
perfect estimation and I(W; θ)→ 0 for asymptotic perfect secrecy.
If µ = 0,
I (V; θ) ∝ N 12
√
logN →∞, when N →∞.
I (W; θ) ∝ N
(
N−
1
2
)2
→ O(1), when N →∞.
In this case, the secrecy at eavesdropper can be constrained to a constant, however,
the performance of the FC can still be guaranteed to be asymptotic perfect at the
rate of O
(√
N
)
.
If we choose µ = 1
3
,
I (V; θ) ∝ N 13
√
4
3
logN →∞, when N →∞.
I (W; θ) ∝ N −13 → 0, when N →∞.
Hence, both asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect estimation can
be achieved under standard Gaussian observation noise. Similarly, when µ = 2, the
constraints can be satisfied as well.
When µ = 1, the performance of the FC is guaranteed, however, eavesdropper’s
performance diminishes at the rate of 1/N .
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4.3.1 Performance Comparison in Detection and Estimation
In Section 3.3.2, we summarized the detection performance for the FC and eaves-
dropper, as

DE ∝ N−µ,
DF ∝ N 1−µ2 .
where (0 < µ < 1).
And in this section, we derived the estimation performance as,

I (W; θ) ∝ N−µ,
I (V; θ) ∝ N 1−µ2 √(1 + µ) logN.
where (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1). We can see that the inference performance trade-off for the FC
and eavesdropper under detection and estimation are almost the same.
4.4 Estimation under Bayesian Framework
We analyzed the case where the parameter θ is fixed but unknown, now we continue
to investigate the case where θ is a random variable. In this case, the prior density
about parameter θ should be considered in estimation. Similar to the classical case,
the Bayesian CRLB (BCRLB) at the FC and at eavesdropper are defined, respectively,
as
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BCRLBF (V; θ) = (I (V; θ))
−1 =
(∫ ∞
−∞
NI(η, θ, ρF )p (θ) dθ + I(λ)
)−1
BCRLBE (W; θ) = (I (W; θ))
−1 =
(∫ ∞
−∞
NI(η, θ, ρE)p (θ) dθ + I(λ)
)−1 (4.12)
where
I(λ) =
∫ (
∂ log p (θ)
∂θ
)2
p(θ)dθ,
and p (θ) is the prior density of the parameter θ and I (η, θ, ρ) is from Equation (4.4).
4.4.1 θ ∼ N (0, 1)
For the case that θ ∼ N (0, 1) such that p (θ) = 1√
2pi
exp
(
− θ2
2
)
and because the
channel of the FC is noiseless, we can simplify the FI at the FC for one sensor as
follows,
I (η, θ, ρF ) =
f 2 (η − θ)
Q (η − θ) (1−Q (η − θ))
Assume the observation noise has unit variance, I (η, θ, ρF ) is maximized when
η − θ = 0, therefore, Q (η − θ) = 1
2
.
I (η, θ, ρF ) =
(
1√
2pi
)2
1
2
1
2
=
2
pi
.
Therefore, the total FI at the FC is NI (η, θ, ρF ) =
2N
pi
, which indicates that the
total FI at the FC is O(N) at most.
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However, what if Q(η − θ) 6= 1
2
? How should we choose η to satisfy the secrecy
constraints under Bayesian framework? Similarly, utilize Mills ratio in Equation (4.9)
and set η as
√
(1 + µ) logN , where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Hence, the total FI at the FC,
I (V; θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
N (η − θ) f (η − θ) p (θ) dθ
∝
∫ ∞
−∞
N
√
(1 + µ) logNN−
1+µ
2 p (θ) dθ
= N
1−µ
2
√
(1 + µ) logN →∞, as N →∞.
For eavesdropper, the total FI,
I (W; θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Nf 2 (η − θ) p (θ) dθ
∝
∫ ∞
−∞
N
(
N−
1+µ
2
)2
p (θ) dθ
= N−µ.
Therefore,

I (W; θ)→ 0; 0 < µ ≤ 1
I (W; θ)→ O (1) ; µ = 0
Similar to the classical setting case, the equations show that the secrecy constrains
can be satisfied by choosing the appropriate threshold under Bayesian framework.
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4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we compare the estimation performance under two settings, one is a
classical setting where the parameter is fixed but unknown; the other is a Bayesian
setting where θ is a random variable.
4.5.1 Fixed but Unknown Parameter in Gaussian Noise
We first compare the estimation performance at eavesdropper and at the FC via the
distributed estimation of a fixed but unknown parameter with zero mean additive
white Gaussian noise. Specifically, the sensor observations are given in Equation
(4.1), where Zi ∼ N (0, 1) is the normalized observation noise following a standard
Gaussian distribution. Both the FC and eavesdropper employ Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MLE) to obtain θˆF and θˆE based on V and W, respectively. The two
MSE estimates are
θˆF =
(
η −Q−1
(
V¯ − ρF
1− 2ρF
))
θˆE =
(
η −Q−1
(
W¯ − ρE
1− 2ρE
))
,
(4.13)
where V¯ , W¯ are the mean of received outputs for the FC and eavesdropper, respec-
tively.
We first examine the system secrecy when the FC has a perfect channel, ρF = 0,
eavesdropper has a noisy channel, ρE = 0.40, and the threshold η =
√
4
3
logN . First,
the FI as a function of N for θ = 1 is displayed in Figure 4.2. We see that the FI
at the FC is increasing with the number of sensors, while the FI at eavesdropper is
close to zero, consistent with the proofs for Equation (4.10) and (4.11).
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Figure 4.2: Total Fisher Information for the FC and eavesdropper with
different number of sensors given θ = 1, η =
√
4
3
logN under classical setting.
As the number of sensors grow, the FI at the FC increases significantly
while the FI at eavesdropper is close to zero.
Under the same conditions of η, ρE and ρF , via Monte-Carlo simulation with 1000
trials, we plot the resulting mean and MSE of the estimated parameters θF and θE by
the FC and eavesdropper in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, respectively, where θ ∈ [0, 1.4],
and the number of sensors is fixed at N = 100. In both figures, the trends show that
eavesdropper, with a larger BSC BER, cannot accurately estimate θ. Meanwhile,
the FC can almost perfectly estimate the parameter, where the estimated parameter
mean is close to the ground truth in Figure 4.3 and the MSE is close to zero in Figure
74
4.4.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Parameter θ
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
M
ea
n
of
E
st
im
at
ed
P
ar
am
et
er
FC
Eve with ρE = 0.4
Eve with ρE = 0.3
Eve with ρE = 0.2
Ground Truth
Figure 4.3: Mean of estimated signal by the FC and eavesdropper with dif-
ferent bit error rates under classical setting, where η =
√
4
3
logN , N = 100.
The FC’s estimation is close to the ground truth, while for eavesdropper,
the estimations are off even the one with small bit error rate.
In Figure 4.5, we plot the exact MSE against the number of sensors for both
the FC and eavesdropper, where the channel of the FC is noiseless, ρF = 0, and
eavesdropper’s channel is noisy, ρE = 0.4. Meanwhile, SNR = 0 dB, the threshold η
is set as
√
logN . We can see that the MSE of the FC diminishes close to zero while the
MSE of eavesdropper are much higher than the FC’s as the number of sensors increases
from 10 to 100. As the performance metric, the MSEs of the FC and eavesdropper in
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Figure 4.4: MSE of estimated signals by the FC and eavesdroppers with
different bit error rates under classical setting, where the threshold, η =√
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3
logN , N = 100.
this figure indicate that the FC significantly outperforms eavesdropper in estimating
the parameter θ with merely 10 to 100 sensors.
4.5.2 Simulations under Bayesian Framework
We continue comparing the performance at the FC and eavesdropper under Bayesian
setting where the parameter θ is a random variable. Here, we assume that the
parameter, θ, follows standard Gaussian distribution, N (0, 1), and the observation
noise also follows Gaussian distribution,N (0,√2). The FC channel is set to noiseless,
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Figure 4.5: Exact Mean squared error for both the FC and eavesdrop-
per with different number of sensors under classical setting, where the
parameter, θ = 1 and the threshold, η =
√
logN .
ρF = 0 and ρE = 0.4, the threshold η =
√
logN .
In Figure 4.6, we plot Fisher information with respect to the number of sensors
for the FC and eavesdropper. Similar to the case of classical setting, the FI at the
FC is increasing as the number of sensors increases from 10 to 100, meanwhile the FI
at eavesdropper is close to zero. The growth rate at the FC is proportional to
√
N ,
which is consistent with the proof in Section 4.4.1.
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Figure 4.6: Total Fisher Information for both the FC and eavesdropper
with different number of sensors under Bayesian framework, where η =√
logN .
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CHAPTER 5
SECRECY CONSTRAINED DISTRIBUTED INFERENCE
WITH FADING CHANNEL MODELS
In Chapter 3 and 4, we consider the secrecy constrained distributed detection and
distributed estimation, respectively, where local sensors and the FC are connected
through a parallel binary symmetric channel. In this chapter, we take fading channel
into consideration because fading channels are also widely used in wireless communica-
tions for modeling scattered signals that reach a receiver by multiple paths. Hence, in
this chapter, we consider the distributed inference problems under secrecy constraints
with Rayleigh fading with BPSK signaling. This chapter is organized as the follows.
In Section 5.1, we consider the secrecy constrained distributed detection with Rayleigh
fading with BPSK signaling. Similar analysis are given in Section 5.2 for distributed
estimation. We present simulations results in Section 5.3.
5.1 Secrecy Constrained Distributed Detection with Parallel
Rayleigh Fading Binary Symmetric Channel
Similar to the case in Chapter 3, the network consists of N sensors connected in
parallel to a FC via a set of parallel accessible channels. Xi and pk (Xi) = p (Xi;Hk)
are the sensor observation and the pdf under hypothesis Hk at sensor i, respectively,
where k = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Sensors employ the same quantization rule as set
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in Equation (4.2). The wireless communication channels between each sensor and the
FC are assumed to be Rayleigh fading BSCs, where the channel gain for the FC and
eavesdropper are hF,i and hE,i, respectively, and the corresponding BERs are ρF,i and
ρE,i. The sensors observations and the channels are assumed to be conditionally i.i.d..
For each sensor, the probability of false alarm is α and the probability of detection is
β, where
α = P (Ui|H0) = P
(
p1 (Xi)
p0 (Xi)
≥ η|H0
)
β = P (Ui|H1) = P
(
p1 (Xi)
p0 (Xi)
≥ η|H1
)
At the FC level, the received decisions are,
P (Vi = 1|H0) = αF = ρF + (1− 2ρF )α
P (Vi = 1|H1) = βF = ρF + (1− 2ρF ) β
where hF is the channel gain for the FC and Zi is the observation noise. Similarly for
eavesdropper,
P (Wi = 1|H0) = αE = ρE + (1− 2ρE)α
P (Wi = 1|H1) = βE = ρE + (1− 2ρE) β
Assume the average SNR between local sensors and the FC to be ξF and the
average SNR between sensors and eavesdropper be ξE, according to the derivation in
[63] and since the channels are independent and identical, the bit error rate of the
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fading channel with binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation (with coherent
detection) is
ρE = ρE,i =
1−ΨE
2
ρF = ρF,i =
1−ΨF
2
,
(5.1)
where,
ΨE =
√
ξE
1 + ξE
ΨF =
√
ξF
1 + ξF
(5.2)
Recall from Chapter 3.3, we analyze the maximum achievable performance trade-
off between the FC and eavesdropper using the KLD ratio under Neyman-Pearson
framework. Here, we use the same technique with Rayleigh fading channel model.
According to Appendix B, the KLD ratio for parallel channel is
R =
D(αF , βF )
D(αE, βE)
=
(1− 2ρF )2(1− ρE)ρE
(1− 2ρE)2(1− ρF )ρF
(5.3)
Plugging in ρF and ρE in Equation (5.1), we have
81
R =
(
1− 21−ΨF
2
)2 (
1− 1−ΨE
2
)
1−ΨE
2(
1− 21−ΨE
2
)2 (
1− 1−ΨF
2
)
1−ΨF
2
=
Ψ2F (1−ΨE)2
Ψ2E(1−ΨF )2
=
ξF
1+ξF
(
1− ξE
1+ξE
)
ξE
1+ξE
(
1− ξF
1+ξF
)
=
ξF
1+ξF
(
1
1+ξE
)
ξE
1+ξE
(
1
1+ξF
)
=
ξF
ξE
.
(5.4)
Similar to the case of parallel binary symmetric channel, when ρF 6= 0 and ρE 6= 0,
shown in Section 3.3.3, we derive the maximum achievable ratio and we summarize
it as the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Maximum Achievable Performance Trade-off with Rayleigh
Fading Channel When both eavesdropper and the FC have noisy Rayleigh fading
channels, with the average SNRs ξE and ξF , respectively, the secrecy constraints can
only be achieved for certain thresholds TE and TF such that TF/TE is no more than
the ratio, R = ξF
ξE
, regardless of the number of sensors, N .
Remark 2. To improve the secrecy in WSNs, one needs to either decrease SNR of
eavesdropper, ξE, by using directional antenna or keys, or one can increase ξF . For
example, if secrecy requirements for a WSN are TF = 10 and TE = 1, then ξF/ξE ≥
TF/TE = 10 dB. It means that the SNR of the FC needs to be at least 10 dB better
than eavesdropper’s, which requires the FC to have high communication quality.
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5.2 Secrecy Constrained Distributed Estimation with Paral-
lel Rayleigh Fading Binary Symmetric Channel
Similarly for the distributed estimation with parallel Rayleigh fading binary symmet-
ric channel, sensors observes one parameter θ. Here, we consider the classical setting,
where θ is fixed but unknown,
Xi = θ + Zi, 1 = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where Zi is an additive i.i.d zero mean observation noise. We assume the sensor
observations to be conditionally i.i.d given the underlying parameter θ, which results
in
f(X|θ) =
N∏
i=1
f(Xi|θ),
where f(X|θ) and f(Xi|θ) are known probability density functions (pdfs) and Xi is
the observation of sensor i.
Same with the assumption in Chapter 4, the sensors employ identical quantization
rules such that
η1 = η2 = · · · = ηN = η,
where the sensors observations are quantized to a single bit Ui according to the
threshold ηi.
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Ui =

1, Xi > ηi
0, Xi ≤ ηi
∀i. (5.5)
At the local sensor level, the
Pr (Ui = 1|θ) = β = Pr (θ + Zi > η) = Q (η − θ)
Pr (Ui = 0|θ) = 1− β = 1− Pr (Ui = 1|θ) .
Meanwhile the received decisions at the receiver level are
Pr(Vi = 1|θ) = (1− 2ρF ) Pr(Ui = 1|θ) + ρF ,
Pr(Wi = 1|θ) = (1− 2ρE) Pr(Ui = 1|θ) + ρE.
Again, we consider the FI as the performance metric for the FC, I (V; θ) =
NI(η, θ, ρF ) and eavesdropper, I (W; θ) = NI(η, θ, ρE), where
I(η, θ, ρ) =
f 2(η − θ)(1− 2ρ)2
(ρ+ (1− 2ρ)Q(η − θ))(1− ρ− (1− 2ρ)Q(η − θ)) ,
and we compute the FI ratio . From Section 4.2, we have the FI ratio, which is
exactly the same with Equation (5.3). In other words, the supremum of the FI ratio
is
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sup (R) =
ρE(1− ρE)(1− 2ρF )2
ρF (1− ρF )(1− 2ρE)2
=
ξF
ξE
.
Similarly, the secrecy of the network can be improved by either increasing the FC
SNR or decreasing eavesdropper SNR.
This ratio is of help in achieving asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect
estimation in that the requirements are
I (W; θ) = NI (η, θ, ρE)→ 0, N →∞,
I (V; θ) = NI (η, θ, ρF )→∞, N →∞,
If ξE is zero, the maximum FI ratio is infinity, which means it is possible to achieve
asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect estimation.
5.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we plot and evaluate the performance trade-off between the FC and
eavesdropper for both the detection and estimation problems.
5.3.1 Secrecy Constrained Distributed Detection
For distributed detection problems, we consider a constant signal with zero mean
additive white Gaussian noise. The sensor observations are given by

H1 : Xi = A+ Zi
H0 : Xi = Zi,
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Figure 5.1: The maximum achievable KLD ratio for secrecy constrained
distributed detection, ξF = 0 dB and ξE = −7 dB.
where Zi ∼ N (0, 1) is the normalized observation noise following a standard Gaussian
distribution, A > 0 is a fixed constant signal to be detected with signal-to-noise ratio,
SNR = 20 log10A dB.
We first plot the maximum achievable KLD ratio, DF/DE, in Figure 5.1. SNR
for the FC and eavesdropper are set as, ξF = 0 dB and ξE = −7 dB, respectively.
From the figure, we can see that the simulated maximum KLD ratio is very close to
the theoretical one derived in Equation (5.4).
In Figure (5.2), the actual KLD is plotted against the number of sensors N . As
we expected, as the number of sensors grows, the FI at the FC increases faster than
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Figure 5.2: The actual KLD for the FC and eavesdropper with different
number of sensors, ξF = 0 dB and ξE = −7 dB.
eavesdropper FI.
We show the maximum KLD ratio in Figure 5.3. The SNR of eavesdropper is
fixed to −7 dB (corresponds to 0.2 in the figure), and the SNR of the FC increases
to 20. We can see that it is linear between the maximum KLD ratio and SNR of the
FC.
5.3.2 Secrecy Constrained Distributed Estimation
The estimation performance at eavesdropper and at the FC via the distributed esti-
mation of a fixed but unknown signal with zero mean additive white Gaussian noise.
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Figure 5.3: The maximum KLD ratio for the FC and eavesdropper with
ξE = −7 dB.
Specifically, the sensor observations are given in Equation (4.1), where Zi ∼ N (0, 1)
is the normalized observation noise following a standard Gaussian distribution. Both
the FC and eavesdropper employ Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to obtain
θˆF and θˆE based on V and W, respectively. The two MSE estimates are
θˆF =
(
η −Q−1
(
V¯ − ρF
1− 2ρF
))
θˆE =
(
η −Q−1
(
W¯ − ρE
1− 2ρE
))
,
(5.6)
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Figure 5.4: The actual FI for secrecy constrained distributed estimation
with ξE = −7 dB, the number of sensors, N = 100.
where V¯ , W¯ are the mean of received outputs for the FC and eavesdropper, respec-
tively.
We show the actual estimation performance of the FC and eavesdropper in Figure
5.4. The SNR of eavesdropper is fixed to −7 dB, the number of sensors is 100, the
threshold η =
√
logN and the SNR of the FC increases from 0.2 to 20. We can see
that the FI at the FC is increasing with the increment of the SNR, which means the
secrecy of the network can be improved by increasing the FC SNR.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary
Comprised of a large number of low-cost, low-power, mobile and miniature sensors,
WSNs are widely employed in many applications, such as environmental monitoring,
health-care, and diagnostics of complex systems. For these applications, the data
collected by local sensors are extremely sensitive, and care must be taken to prevent
that information from being leaked to any malicious third parties, e.g., eavesdroppers.
In WSNs, the sensor outputs are often transmitted across a wireless communication
network to legitimate users such as a fusion center for final decision-making. However,
because of wireless links across the network, data are vulnerable to security breaches.
Eavesdropping on wireless links between the sensor and the legitimate user by a
third party (eavesdropper) is defined as an eavesdropping attacks. The reason we
focus on eavesdropping attack is that it forms the basis or starting point for a large
number of different, more malicious attack strategies. For example, if Byzantine, jam-
ming attackers or intruders have reliable information provided by the eavesdropper,
their subsequent attacks can be more efficient.
Hence, we focus on security issues for WSNs especially on secrecy constrained
distributed inference in WSNs. The off-the-shelf solution for eavesdropping attack
is cryptography techniques, public-key and symmetric key algorithms. However, due
90
to the constraints on computational power, bandwidth, and time constraints, these
algorithms could hardly be implemented for WSNs. Even though the symmetric keys
algorithm consume relatively low-power, they do require the nodes to have the com-
putational capability to perform the required tasks which may not be true for some
of the nodes. Therefore, we resort to a physical-layer security approach which utilizes
the characteristics of the physical layer, including transmission channels noises, and
the information of the source. Additionally, physical-layer security for distributed
detection is scalable due to the low computational complexity. Physical-layer security
approaches can be used along with cryptography techniques to further enhance WSNs
and make systems even more secure.
Chapter 3 considered the secrecy constrained distributed detection in WSNs under
both the Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian frameworks using physical-layer security
approaches by adjusting sensor optimality points. We analyzed the asymptotic de-
tection performance and proposed a novel way of analyzing the maximum perfor-
mance trade-off using KLD ratio between the FC and eavesdropper. Under the
N-P framework, we showed that eavesdropper’s detection performance can be limited
such that her decision-making is no better than random guessing; meanwhile, the
detection performance at the FC is guaranteed at the prespecified level. Similar
analyses and proofs are provided under the Bayesian framework, where it was shown
that eavesdropper can be constrained to an error probability level equal to her prior
information. Additionally, we derived the asymptotic error exponent and showed that
asymptotic perfect secrecy and asymptotic perfect detection are possible by increasing
the number of sensors under both frameworks if the FC has noiseless channels to the
sensors. The numerical results showed that with reasonable number of sensors, we
can guarantee the detection performance of the FC to achieve the desired level, while
91
the detectability at eavesdropper deteriorates significantly as the number of sensors
increases. These results in this chapter can be applied to improve the secrecy of
WSNs against eavesdropping attacks at the physical-layer.
Chapter 4 concentrated on the secrecy constrained distributed estimation in WSNs
which are subject to an eavesdropping attack under both classical setting and Bayesian
framework. The eavesdropper has access to all sensors outputs instead of partial
access. The maximum achievable secrecy performance was derived and it was proved
that under the condition that eavesdropper has a noisy channel and the FC has a
noiseless channel, both APS and APE can be achieved. The secrecy design method
in this dissertation might greatly enhance the secrecy in distributed estimation for
large sensor networks.
Chapter 5 considered secrecy constrained distributed inference with Rayleigh
fading binary symmetric channel models. We derived the maximum achievable per-
formance ratio and show that the number of sensors does not affect this ratio. We
showed that for both detection and estimation problems, asymptotic perfect secrecy
cannot be achieved.
6.2 Future Research Topics
We investigated distributed detection and estimation under secrecy constraints for
parallel channels and a few other research topics within this framework can be
investigated as well.
• The design of distributed inference algorithms depends on the underlying sensor
network topology. Different topologies requires different algorithms in designing
secrecy rules for sensors and the FC. Therefore we considered parallel topology
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in this dissertation; however, the results can be extended to distributed inference
with generalized topology, such as tree topology shown in Figure 1.3. The
structure can be balanced or unbalanced. In a balanced structure, sensors at the
same level have equal numbers of children where an unbalanced structure does
not have such restriction. For tree-structured systems, each sensor observes the
same phenomenon, quantizes their observations and then transmits the decision
to their parent node [96], and the parent node keeps doing the same until the
decisions are reached by the FC. Then global decision rule is designed so that
the FC could make the final decision.
• In this dissertation, we considered the scenario that the eavesdropping attacker
has a noisier channel than the FC, and has access to all the sensors outputs.
We could also consider situations such that the attacker could have only partial
access to the sensor decisions; however, the channel quality is not necessarily
worse than the FC’s.
• We could also consider the scenario where the FC and eavesdropper may have
access to side information that allows them to improve their performance. In
such a scenario, the same approach in this dissertation can still be employed.
Special treatment utilizing the side information may help further improve the
inference performance.
• We did not consider the model uncertainty in this dissertation. Considering real
data at the sensors in a real application would make it more applicable. In such
case, we may have to divide the data into training and testing sets, and apply
machine learning algorithms to the problem. , Machine learning in distributed
systems itself is an interesting topic and awaits to be further pursued.
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• In this dissertation, we considered eavesdroppers, other more sophisticated
cyber threats to WSN, such as intrusion, jamming or Byzantine, should also
be investigated in the future. The interaction and relation among cyber attacks
bring new dimensions to the distributed inference problem.
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APPENDIX A
KLD ANALYSIS
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We first analyze (α, β) ≈ (0, 0),
D
(
α¯, β¯
)
= α¯ ln
α¯
β¯
+ (1− α¯) ln 1− α¯
1− β¯
= α¯ ln
(
1 +
α¯− β¯
β¯
)
+ (1− α¯) ln
(
1 +
β¯ − α¯
1− β¯
)
.
Because of the properties of binary symmetric channel, we have
α¯ = ρ¯+ (1− 2ρ¯)α
β¯ = ρ¯+ (1− 2ρ¯)β.
Given the following Taylor series expansion
ln(1 + x) =
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n−1x
n
n
,
and setting x ≈ 0, then ln(1 + x) ≈ x− 1
2
x2.
A.0.1 (α, β) ≈ (0, 0) and ρ¯ 6= 0
It can be shown that if ρ¯ 6= 0,
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α¯− β¯
β¯
≈ 0
β¯ − α¯
1− β¯ ≈ 0
α¯
β¯
≈ 1
1− α¯
1− β¯ ≈ 1
(A.1)
D
(
α¯, β¯
) ≈ α¯( α¯− β¯
β¯
− 1
2
(
α¯− β¯
β¯
)2)
+ (1− α¯)
(
β¯ − α¯
1− β¯ −
1
2
(
β¯ − α¯
1− β¯
)2)
=
(
β¯ − α¯)(1− α¯
1− β¯ −
α¯
β¯
)
− (β¯ − α¯)
2
2
(
1− α¯
(1− β¯)2 +
α¯
β¯2
)
.
Because of Equation (A.1),
D
(
α¯, β¯
) ≈ (β¯ − α¯)2(
1− β¯) β¯ −
(
β¯ − α¯)2
2
(
1
1− β¯ +
1
β¯
)
=
1
2
(
β¯ − α¯)2(
1− β¯) β¯
=
1
2
(β − α)2 (1− 2ρ¯)2
(1− ρ¯− (1− 2ρ¯) β) (ρ¯+ (1− 2ρ¯)β) .
(A.2)
When (α, β) ≈ (0, 0) and β
α
→∞,
D
(
α¯, β¯
) ≈ 1
2
β2(1− 2ρ¯)2
(1− ρ¯)ρ¯ .
Using the same procedure, it is straightforward to show that
D
(
α¯, β¯
) ≈ D (β¯, α¯) ≈ 1
2
β2(1− 2ρ¯)2
(1− ρ¯)ρ¯ . (A.3)
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A.0.2 (α, β) ≈ (0, 0) and ρ¯ = 0
If ρ¯ = 0, one needs to use a different approximation as follows,
D
(
α¯, β¯
)
= α¯ ln
α¯
β¯
+ (1− α¯) ln 1− α¯
1− β¯
= α¯ ln
α¯
β¯
+ (1− α¯) ln
(
1 +
β¯ − α¯
1− β¯
)
≈ α¯ ln α¯
β¯
+ (1− α¯) β¯ − α¯
1− β¯
≈ α¯ ln α¯
β¯
+ β¯ − α¯
≈ α¯ β¯
α¯
= β¯
= β as β  α when α→ 0.
(A.4)
and
D(β¯, α¯) = β¯ ln
β¯
α¯
+
(
1− β¯) ln(1 + α¯− β¯
1− α¯
)
≈ β¯ ln β¯
α¯
+
(
1− β¯)( α¯− β¯
1− α¯
)
≈ β¯ ln β¯
α¯
+ α¯− β¯
= β¯
(
ln
β¯
α¯
+
α¯
β¯
− 1
)
≈ β¯
(
ln
β¯
α¯
− 1
)
.
Since, ρ¯ = 0, β¯ = β, α¯ = α,
D(β¯, α¯) ≈ β
(
ln
β
α
− 1
)
. (A.5)
112
The proof for (α, β) ≈ (1, 1) relative to D(α¯, β¯) and D(β¯, α¯) can be shown in a
similar fashion.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF MAXIMUM ACHIEVABLE PERFORMANCE
TRADE-OFF UNDER NEYMAN- PEARSON
FRAMEWORK
114
If ln (p1(x)/p0(x)) is unbounded below, then as α→ 1, η → 0, applying L’Hopital’s
rule to the ratio R(α),
R(1) = lim
α→1
d
dα
D (αF , βF )
d
dα
D (αE, βE)
= lim
α→1
dαF
dα
(
d
dαF
D (αF , βF )
)
dαE
dα
(
d
dαE
D (αE, βE)
)
= lim
α→1
β→1
η→0
(1− 2ρF )
(
η βF−αF
(1−βF )βF + log
αF (1−βF )
βF (1−αF )
)
(1− 2ρE)
(
η βE−αE
(1−βE)βE + log
αE(1−βE)
βE(1−αE)
) =
lim
α→1
β→1
η→0
(1− 2ρF )2 (β − α)
(
η
(1−βF )βF +
log
(
1+
αF−βF
βF (1−αF )
)
βF−αF
)
(1− 2ρE)2 (β − α)
(
η
(1−βE)βE +
log
(
1+
αE−βE
βE(1−αE)
)
βE−αE
) .
Since
lim
x→0
log(1 + x)
x
= 1,
lim
α→1
β→1
log
(
1 + αF−βF
βF (1−αF )
)
βF − αF = limα→1β→1
−1
βF (1− αF ) ,
Therefore,
R (1) = lim
α→1
β→1
η→0
(1− 2ρF )2
(
η
(1−βF )βF − 1βF (1−αF )
)
(1− 2ρE)2
(
η
(1−βE)βE − 1βE(1−αE)
)
=
(1− 2ρF )2 (1− ρE) ρE
(1− 2ρE)2 (1− ρF ) ρF
.
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Similarly, if ln (p1(x)/p0(x)) is unbounded above, then as α→ 0, η →∞,
R(0) =
(1− 2ρF )2 (1− ρE) ρE
(1− 2ρE)2 (1− ρF ) ρF
= R(1). (B.1)
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APPENDIX C
SECRECY AND DETECTION TRADE-OFF UNDER
BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK
117
Plug βE, αE from Equation (3.4) in Equation (3.18), we have
(
(1− 2ρE)β + ρE
(1− 2ρE)α + ρE
)N
=
β +
(
ρE
1−2ρE
)
α +
(
ρE
1−2ρE
)
N ≤ pi0
pi1
.
Let τ = ρE
1−2ρE , then
(
β + τ
α + τ
)N
≤ pi0
pi1
,
⇒β + τ ≤
(
pi0
pi1
) 1
N
(α + τ),
⇒β ≤
(
pi0
pi1
) 1
N
(α + τ)− τ,
(C.1)
or
α ≥
(
pi0
pi1
) 1
N
(β + τ)− τ. (C.2)
In this case, we can choose the randomization between A = (αA, βA) and B =
(αB, βB) in Figure C.1, where the region of operation is the region inside the two red
curves. However, it is not ideal for Bayesian framework in that it does not consider
the prior information. We only need to consider the limiting property of A and B.
Utilizing the fact that A → A˜ and B → B˜ as N → ∞ where A˜ = (0, βA˜) and
B˜ = (αB˜, 1) and Pe(A,B) > Pe(A˜, B˜), we consider A˜ and B˜ instead.
C.0.1 Case1: At Point A˜ = (0, βF )
In this case, the probability of false alarm of the FC is zero, since αF = 0, from
Equation (3.3), we know that α = 0, and after inserting in Equation (C.1)
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Figure C.1: Operation Region is the inside area of two ROC curves.
βF = β =
((
pi0
pi1
) 1
N
− 1
)
τ. (C.3)
Therefore, the FC decision rule should be
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
decides H0 when receiving all zeros,
decides H1 otherwise.
The probability of error of the FC is
Pe = α
N
F pi0 + (1− βF )N pi1,
= (1− βF )N pi1.
Pm = 1− Pd, where Pd = βF from Equation (C.3), with
lim
N→∞
lnPm = lim
N→∞
N ln
(
1−
((
pi0
pi1
) 1
N
− 1
)
τ
)
= lim
N→∞
ln
(
1−
((
pi0
pi1
) 1
N − 1
)
τ
)
1
N
.
Apply L’Hopital’s rule, and let x = 1
N
we have
lim
x→0
lnPm = lim
x→0
(
1−
((
pi0
pi1
)x
− 1
)
τ
)′
1−
((
pi0
pi1
)x
− 1
)
τ
= lim
x→0
(
−τ
((
pi0
pi1
)x
− 1
))′
= lim
x→0
(
−τ
(
pi0
pi1
)x)′
= lim
x→0
(
−τ ln pi0
pi1
(
pi0
pi1
)x)
= −τ ln pi0
pi1
.
Therefore,
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Pm =
(
pi0
pi1
)−τ
=
(
pi0
pi1
)− ρE
1−2ρE
.
The probability of error of the FC at operating point A˜ is
Pe = Pmpi1 = pi1
(
pi0
pi1
)− ρE
1−2ρE
.
This shows that as long as ρE < 0.5, the probability of error of the FC at A˜ is not
zero.
C.0.2 Case2: At Point B˜ = (αF , 1)
The detection probability of the FC is one, plug β = 1 in Equation (C.2), we have
αF = α = (1 + τ)
(
pi1
pi0
) 1
N − τ . Thus, the FC decision rule should be

decides H1 when receiving all ones,
decides H0 otherwise.
The probability of error of the FC is
Pe = α
N
F pi0 + (1− βF )Npi1,
= αNF pi0.
With
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lim
N→∞
lnPf = lim
N→∞
N ln
(
(1 + τ)
(
pi0
pi1
) 1
N
− τ
)
,
= lim
N→∞
ln
(
(1 + τ)
(
pi0
pi1
) 1
N − τ
)
1
N
.
Apply L’Hopital’s rule with x = 1
N
we have
lim
x→0
lnPf = lim
x→0
(
(1 + τ)
(
pi1
pi0
)x)′
(1 + τ)
(
pi1
pi0
)x
− τ
,
= lim
x→0
(
(1 + τ)
(
pi1
pi0
)x)′
,
= lim
x→0
(1 + τ) ln
(
pi1
pi0
)(
pi1
pi0
)x
,
= (1 + τ) ln
pi1
pi0
.
Therefore,
Pf =
(
pi1
pi0
)1+τ
=
(
pi1
pi0
)(
pi1
pi0
) ρE
1−2ρE
.
Similarly, the probability of error of the FC given operation point B˜ is
Pe = Pfpi0 = pi1
(
pi0
pi1
)− ρE
1−2ρE
,
which is equivalent to the probability of error at A˜.
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APPENDIX D
DECISION RULE THRESHOLD UNDER BAYESIAN
FRAMEWORK
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In Equation (3.20), we have D(T, α¯) which is an increasing function of T ∈ (α, 1)
and D(T, β¯) is a decreasing function of T ∈ (0, β).Therefore, Pe is minimized when
D(T, α¯) = D(T, β¯). This leads to
D(T, α¯)−D(T, β¯) = 0 =⇒
T ln
T
α¯
+ (1− T ) ln 1− T
1− α¯ − T ln
T
β¯
− (1− T ) ln 1− T
1− β¯ = 0
=⇒ T =
ln 1−α¯
1−β¯
ln β¯
α¯
+ ln 1−α¯
1−β¯
, ∀(α, β).
Alternatively, notice that
T − α¯ =
α¯ ln α¯
β¯
+ (1− α¯) ln 1−α¯
1−β¯
ln β¯
α¯
+ ln 1−α¯
1−β¯
=
D(α¯, β¯)
ln β¯
α¯
+ ln 1−α¯
1−β¯
,
and
β¯ − T = D(β¯, α¯)
ln β¯
α¯
+ ln 1−α¯
1−β¯
.
Thus
β¯ − T
T − α¯ =
D(β¯, α¯)
D(α¯, β¯)
,
or
T =
D(α¯, β¯)β¯ +D(β¯, α¯)α¯
D(β¯, α¯) +D(α¯, β¯)
,
According to the approximation in Table 3.1, if ρ¯ > 0, when (α, β) → (0, 0) or
(α, β)→ (1, 1), D(α¯, β¯) = D(β¯, α¯), therefore
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T ≈ α¯ + β¯
2
= ρ¯+
(1− ρ¯) (α + β)
2
.
When ρ¯ = 0, (α, β)→ (0, 0), β¯ ≈ β and α¯ = α, then
T =
D(α¯, β¯)β +D(β¯, α¯)α
D(α¯, β¯) +D(β¯, α¯)
,
≈ β
2 + β(ln β
α
− 1)α
β + β(ln β
α
− 1) ,
=
β + (ln β
α
− 1)α
ln β
α
=
β − α
ln β
α
+ α.
Similarly, we can calculate the corresponding threshold when (α, β)→ (1, 1),
T =
D(α¯, β¯)β +D(β¯, α¯)α
D(α¯, β¯) +D(β¯, α¯)
,
≈
(1− α)
(
ln 1−α
1−β − 1
)
β + (1− α)α
(1− α)
(
ln 1−α
1−β − 1
)
+ (1− α)
,
= β +
α− β
ln 1−α
1−β
.
We summarize the decision rule threshold T in Table 3.2.
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APPENDIX E
MINIMIZED FISHER INFORMATION RATIO
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From Equation (4.5), we can see that the minimized FI ratio is achieved when the
CDF Q (η − θ) = 1
2
, therefore, plug that into equation (4.5), we have
R =
(1− 2ρF )2(ρE +
(
1− 2ρE)12
)
(1− 2ρE)2(ρF + (1− 2ρF )12)
(1− ρE − (1− 2ρE)12)
(1− ρF − (1− 2ρF )12)
=
(1− 2ρF )2
(1− 2ρE)2
This minimized ratio can also be used to guarantee the performance of the FC
due to channel disparity.
